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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ,
Petitioner,

Supreme Court
Case No.

v.
Court of Appeals
Case No. 900218-CA

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Priority No. 13

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In pretext search cases, under Article I section 14 of the
Utah Constitution, should courts consider the subjective intent of
the searching officer?

OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals7 decision and the trial court's ruling
are in Appendix 1.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Court of Appeals filed the Velasquez decision on
April 1, 1991. This petition is timely under Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 48(a).
This Court's statutory jurisdiction over this petition for
certiorari is provided by Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(3)(a) and
(5) (Supp. 1990).

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The following constitutional provision is contained in the
body of this petition:
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 14 (1953)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Mr. Velasquez was charged with two counts of possession of

controlled substances (R. 8-9). After the trial court denied his
motion to suppress the evidence seized by the police (R. 28-33),
Mr. Velasquez entered a conditional no contest plea to one
possession count, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the
motion to suppress (R. 36-43).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of
the motion to dismiss.

B.

FACTS
The issue before the trial court and the Court of Appeals

was the pretextual nature of Officer Hedenstrom's conduct in
stopping Mr. Velasquez and searching his car.

See Appendix 2,

containing the motion to suppress filed in the trial court, and the
table of contents in Mr. Velasquez's opening brief in the Court of
Appeals.

In apparent reliance on State v. Sierra's rule that the

subjective intent of the searching officer is not to be considered,
754 P.2d 972, 977-979 and n.3, the trial court cind the Court of
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Appeals did not consider the following evidence of Officer
Hedenstrom's pretextual intent:
Officer Hedenstrom did not stop Mr. Velasquez's car when
Officer Hedenstrom first noticed the mismatched license plates, as
Mr. Velasquez was parking the car on State Street (T. 3-4).
Officer Hedenstrom explained why he did not cite
Mr. Velasquez for the mismatched plates:

"The rear plate was the

correct plate." (T. 12). Officer Hedenstrom did not testify about
when he ascertained that the rear plate was correct (for example, if
he called in the registration after he noticed the car parking on
9th South and State Street, and before the stop).
Officer Hedenstrom indicated he decided to arrest
Mr. Velasquez for "no license" and that the decision to arrest was
within his discretion (T. 9-10).

Prior to and during the search of

the car, Mr. Velasquez apparently was not taken by Officer Mosier
(who had a separate patrol car from Officer Hedenstrom) to the
police station for "no license" but apparently was held until the
search was complete—he was booked for "no license" and for
possession of a controlled substance (T. 8-9).
Officer Hedenstrom produced no inventory policy and
indicated that the inventory sheet was not produced with the police
reports and that he did not have a copy of the inventory sheet
(T. 11, 14). Officer Hedenstrom maintained that his performance of
the impound-inventory search complied with department policy
(T. 14), explaining that, as a matter of policy, impounded vehicles
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are searched "for valuables and any evidence." (T. 6) (emphasis
added).

REASON WHY QUESTION PRESENTED JUSTIFIES ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
This Court should grant certiorari on the question, because
Utah law in pretext cases, following confused federal precedent, is
inconsistent.

This Court should clarify that under Article I

section 14 of the Utah Constitution,1 evidence of the officer's
subjective intent is relevant in pretext search cases.

A.

PRETEXT CASE LAW IS CONFUSING.
The role of subjective intent of the officer in pretext

cases involves a great deal of confusing case law and has spawned a
fair amount of scholarly debate.

Appendix 3 to this petition

contains an article giving an overview of the case law and
commentary, Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After
Never Leaving," 66 U. Detroit L.Rev. 363 (1989), hereinafter
"Burkoff article".2

1. Article I section 14 provides, "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or thing to be seized."
2. See also LaFave, Search and Seizure, section 1.4, pages
80 through 97, and pages 12 through 14 of the supplement; section
5.2(e), pages 456 through 461 and pages 47 through 48 of the
supplement; section 7.5(e), pages 141 through 145 and pages 15 and
16 of the supplement; Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now
You See It, Now You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523 (1984); Burkoff,
(footnote continued)
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In State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the
Utah Court of Appeals explicitly stated that the subjective intent
of the officer is irrelevant, and repeatedly emphasized that the
inquiry under the fourth amendment must be objective.
977-979 and n.3.

.Id. at

The Sierra Court's objective assessment rule is an

accurate quotation of Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978),
"Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has
occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the
officer's actions in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting him at the time,' and
not on the officer's actual state of mind at the
time the challenged action was taken."
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 105 S.Ct. 2778,
2783, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) (quoting Scott v.
United States. 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)).
Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977.3
However, in federal cases prior to and subsequent to Scott,
the United States Supreme Court has evaluated the subjective intent
of the officer in determining whether a fourth amendment violation

(footnote 2 continued)
"Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70 (1982); A. Eisemann Note,
63 B.U.L.Rev. 223 (1983); Haddad, "Pretextual Fourth Amendment
Activity: Another Viewpoint," 18 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 639 (1985); and
Burkoff, "Rejoinder: Truth, Justice and the American Way—Or
Professor Haddad's 'Hard Choices,7" 18 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 695 (1985).
3. It is arguable that the objectivity rule in Scott is
dicta, see Burkoff article at 366-368; Burkoff, "Bad Faith
Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70, 83-84 (1982); Burkoff, "The Pretext
Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref.
523 (1984) ; and that the legal underpinnings of that dicta are
wanting, see LaFave, Search and Seizure, section 1.4, pages 81-83;
A. Eisemann Note, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 223, 242-244 (1983); Burkoff, "Bad
Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70 (1982).
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has occurred.4
But in other cases, the Court has repeated the Scott
objective test relied on by the court in Sierra.5
Utah case law following the federal precedents is also
confusing.

It seems that while the Court of Appeals maintains that

reference to the officer's subjective state of mind is
inappropriate, in practice, the court has found reference to the
officer's subjective state of mind helpful in assessing allegations
of pretext stops.6

4. See e.g. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 500
(1958); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226, 230 (1960); Ker v.
California. 374 U.S. 23, 42-43 (1963); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 376 (1976); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 n.4
(1980) (per curiam); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 215
(1981); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292 (1984) (plurality
opinion); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371, 372 (1987);
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85, 87 (1987); O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 729 (1987) (plurality opinion). See also
Burkoff article at 366-367, 394-408 (1989); Burkoff, "Bad Faith
Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70, 75-83 (1982); Burkoff, "The Pretext
Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref.
523, 544-548 (1984); A. Eisemann Note, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 223, 242-244
(1983).
5. See e.g. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S.
579, 584 n.3 (1983); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S„ 463, 471 (1985).
See also Burkoff article at 369-372; Burkoff, "The Pretext Search
Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523,
524-525, 528-532 (1984).
6. See e.g. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) ("Furthermore, unlik€> the officer in Sierra, Trooper
Avery was not suspicious of Mr. Marshall for other reasons before
the stop, had not followed him in order to find some reason to pull
him over, and before the alleged violation occurred, had not radioed
for help thereby indicating he intended to stop the vehicle.");
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 979-980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("Our
conclusion that a reasonable officer would not have stopped Sierra
for traveling in the left lane is buttressed by the events preceding
Officer Smith's seizure of Sierra's automobile. As previously
(footnote continued)
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B. UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE SUBJECTIVE INTENT OF AN OFFICER
SHOULD BE ONE FACTOR OPEN TO CONSIDERATION IN PRETEXT CASES.
In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), the Court
explicitly held that under the Utah Constitution, "exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police
violations of article I section 14." Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
But see Larocco at 473 (indicating that further development of the
exclusionary rule under the State Constitution might lead to
recognition of exceptions to the rule).
The necessary exclusion of evidence under the Utah
Constitution is the reason that the federal Scott limitation of
subjective intent evidence should be rejected.

Under the federal

fourth amendment Scott decision, the subjective intent of the
officer is not entirely irrelevant, but is pertinent to determining
whether exclusion of evidence is an appropriate remedy.

The Scott

Court stated,

(footnote 6 continued)
stated, Officer Smith was suspicious of Sierra before he observed
Sierra commit any purported traffic violation. He had radioed for a
computer check of the car's license plate but found it was not
stolen. Nevertheless, he radioed for back-up assistance and
exceeded the posted speed limit to catch Sierra."). See also
Burkoff article at 375 and n.56 (citing four Utah cases in which
"motivational evidence" is used in pretext cases); State v. Lovearen
and Southern. 798 P.2d 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), at 768 and n.3
(examining the officer's actual purpose) and at 771 n.10 ("While the
individual officer's own practice may well be probative of what the
hypothetical reasonable officer would do under the circumstances,
his characterization of his intent at the time is essentially
irrelevant.") (emphasis added, citation omitted). But see State v.
Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (disregarding the
motivation of the officer, apparently because a traffic violation
was actually committed and a hypothetical officer would have made
the stop).
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This is not to say, of course, that the
question of motive plays absolutely no part in
the suppression inquiry. On occasion, the motive
with which the officer conducts an illegal search
may have some relevance in determining the
propriety of applying the exclusionary rule. For
example, in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
458, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046, 96 S.Ct. 3021 (1976), we
ruled that evidence unconstitutionally seized by
state police could be introduced in federal civil
tax proceedings because "the imposition of the
exclusionary rule . . . is unlikely to provide
significant, much less substantial, additional
deterrence. It falls outside the offending
officer's zone of primary interest." See also
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268,
276-277, 55 L.Ed.2d 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054 (1978).
This focus on intent, however, becomes relevant
only after it has been determined that the
Constitution was in fact violated. We also have
little doubt that as a practical matter the
judge's assessment of the motives of the officers
may occasionally influence his judgment regarding
the credibility of the officers7 claims with
respect to what information was or was not
available to them at the time of the incident in
question. But the assessment and use of motive
in this limited manner is irrelevant to our
analysis of the questions at issue in this case.
436 U.S. 128, 139 n.13. 7
Because exclusion of evidence is a necessary consequence of
an Article I section 14 violation, the Scott rule, limiting the
relevance of the officer's subjective intent to the exclusion
question, does not apply.
There are several reasons why this Court should explicitly
hold that an officer's subjective intent is relevant to pretext
cases under Article I section 14.

Assuming that deterrence of

7. For criticism of this two-step approach, see Burkoff,
"The Court that Swallowed the Fourth Amendment," 58 Ore.L.Rev. 151,
187-190 (1979).
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police misconduct is one of the bases for the Utah exclusionary
rule, see State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 473 (Utah 1990), a police
officer's improper behavior should not be protected from scrutiny by
reference to fiction (the hypothetical reasonable officer/objective
test).
Such hypothetical justification might draw a court into the
privacy violation.

See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah

1990) (one purpose of the federal exclusionary rule is to "prevent
making a court a 'party to lawless invasions of the constitutional
rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the
fruits of such invasions.'") (quoting Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 13
(1968)).
If evidence of the officer's state of mind is to be ignored
in the application of the deterrent exclusionary rule, it seems that
resort to less reliable and relevant criteria becomes necessary.

Is

the pretext inquiry logically focused on whether a traffic violation
actually occurred?8

Is the pretext inquiry logically focused on

whether the traffic violation is legally prohibited?9

Is the

8. Compare State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979 ("[W]e are
unable to assess whether Sierra even violated Utah's left-lane
provisions. The trial judge did not find that Sierra had violated
any traffic statutes.") with Sierra at 978-979 (recognizing that
even actual traffic violations may be used as subterfuge
justifications for pretextual stops).
9. Compare State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) ("Courts consistently have held that a police officer can
stop a vehicle when he or she believes the vehicle's safety
equipment is not functioning properly.") (emphasis added), with
State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("The proper
inquiry does not focus on whether the officer could validly have
made the stop.") (emphasis in original).
- 9 -

pretext inquiry logically focused on the frequency with which
similar stops have been made by the officer in question or other
officers or by a hypothetical officer?10

C. THIS CASE PROVIDES AN APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE
LAW.
In seeking to suppress the evidence seized in the search
conducted by Officer Hedenstrom, Mr. Velasquez relied on Article I
section 14 of the Utah Constitution and focused on the pretextual
nature of Officer Hedenstrom's conduct (R. 2 5 ) . 1 1

At the hearing on

the motion to suppress, defense counsel referred State v. Sierra,
754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), providing the court with a copy
of Sierra, and asking the court to read the cases prior to ruling on

10. See State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 155 and n. 2
(noting that the officer in question and other officers do not
frequently stop cars for the violation in question); Burkoff, "Bad
Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70# 110 (1982) (noting that
standard police practices may be unconstitutional, that there may be
valid reasons to depart from standard police preictices that have
nothing to do with pretextual motivations).
11. Mr. Velasquez did not explicitly argue that the Court
should clarify the law, recognizing the subjective intent of the
officer as a pertinent consideration under Article I section 14.
This is explained by the fact that this case was heard on March 20
and 22, 1990, before the filing of State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460
(Utah May 30, 1990). See State v. Harcrraves, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. 33
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (court addressed search and seizure issue for
the first time on appeal because the case was heard prior to the
filing of a determinative decision by this Court). See also
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 533 (Vt. 1985) (appellate court will
require rebriefing of state constitutional issues if they have not
yet been raised adequately); State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah
1986) (citing Jewett with approval on topic of state constitutional
analysis).
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the motion (T. 15). Defense counsel addressed the pretext issue as
follows,
In addition to that, Judge, the other thing
is to, and you will see that in the State v,
Sierra, they have indicated, yes, a police
officer may however stop an automobile for a
traffic violation committed in the officer's
presence. Well, it had two different plates on
it, although it was properly registered.
But it goes on to say in Sierra on page 977:
"It is impermissible for law enforcement officers
to use a misdemeanor arrest as a pretext to
search for evidence of a more serious crime."
It is our position that that is what
occurred here, Judge, and the items that were
found ought to be suppressed.
(T. 17-18).
The prosecutor acknowledged and disputed defense counsel's
contention that the stop was pretextual and argued that the search
was a proper inventory search (T. 15-16, 20).
The trial court apparently recognized the objective test
discussed in Sierra, stating,
We have a car with different license
plates. We have the officer not remembering if
there was a registration or not. We have the
defendant without a driver's license, and so what
would the reasonable officer do if he pulls
anyone over at that point? I haven't heard
anything. If he hadn't had a registration, then
it certainly would have been justified to impound
the car. You don't know if it is stolen, or you
don't know what the story is.
[the prosecutor]: Or if the driver was under
arrest, Your Honor, and there was no one else
there that could drive the car away
[the court]: The problem I have with that, is
everyone that is driving a car without a driver's
license arrested and taken to jail? That is kind
of—Maybe they ought to be, but I am kind of
shocked why—What's the circumstances here?
There has to be something articulable.

- 11 -

(T. 20-21).
In apparent reliance on Sierra's ban of consideration of
evidence of the officer's subjective intent, neither the trial court
nor the Court of Appeals recognized evidence of Officer Hedenstrom's
pretextual subjective intent.

Officer Hedenstrom's claim that he

stopped the car because it was improperly registered, as evidenced
by the mismatched license plates, is undermined: Officer Hedenstrom
did not approach Mr. Velasquez concerning the improper indicia of
registration when he first observed it, when the car was in the
process of parking on State Street (T. 3-4); and Officer Hedenstrom
did not cite Mr. Velasquez for improper indicia of registration
(T. 12).
Assuming, arguendo, that the stop was proper, the search
was not a valid inventory search, because Officer Hedenstrom
testified that one of his purposes in conducting the search was to
gather evidence (T. 6). See State v. Hycrh, 711 P.2d 264, 267-268
(Utah 1985) ("the inventory excerption does not apply when the
inventory is merely a 'pretext concealing an investigatory police
motive.'").

CONCLUSION
Mr. Velasquez requests that this Court grant a writ of
certiorari on the question.

- 12 -

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of May, 1991.

Mr. Velasquez

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JAMES A. VALDEZ, hereby certify that ten copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this

day of May, 1991,

DELIVERED by

this

of May, 1991.
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APPENDIX 1
Opinion of the Court of Appeals and
Ruling of the Trial Court
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MaVT.Noonsn
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)
Case No. 900218-CA

v.
Mario Jose Valasquez,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
( A p r i l 1, 1991)

Before Judges Orme, Garff, and Bench.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals his conviction of possessing cocaine
and heroin. He challenges denial of his motion to suppress
evidence of the drugs seized in an inventory search of his
vehicle, impounded for improper licensing and registration. He
claims that the initial stop and subsequent inventory search
were conducted as a pretext to search for drugs.
Although the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress is
-fact-sensitive,- State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), defendant does not challenge the trial court's
findings in its pretrial ruling. The arresting officer was the
only witness to testify at the pretrial hearing. Consequently,
we state the facts based upon the officer's testimony in the
light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. State v.
Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).
The officer testified that he first noted defendant's
vehicle parked with different numbered license plates attached
to the front and rear. A short time later, the officer
observed defendant driving the same improperly licensed vehicle
on the street. Because of the disparate license plates and
apparent improper registration, the officer stopped defendant's
vehicle. When requested by the officer, defendant could not
produce a valid driver's license and said he did not have one.
He did produce a copy of a prior traffic citation issued to a
Jeff Martinez wherein he had been cited for driving without a
driver's license. During this stop, the defendant gave
different names to the officer. No evidence was offered at the
hearing as to whether there was a valid registration card in
the vehicle.
Based upon these events and defendant's admissions, the
officer arrested defendant for driving without a license and
giving false information to an officer. Because defendant was

alone, the car was on a public street and was improperly
licensed, the automobile was impounded. The officer testified
that police department procedures were followed in impounding
the vehicle and conducting an inventory of its contents.
During the inventory, an unlocked cash box was found on the
floor by the driver's seat. The officer opened the box to
ascertain its contents and found heroin and cocaine powder,
along with drug paraphernalia. Defendant was booked for and
charged with driving without a driver's license, giving false
information to the police officer, and possessing the
controlled substances.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-43(1) (1988) requires the issuance
of "two identical registration plates" for every automobile.
Plates issued for use on a vehicle may not be removed from the
vehicle and used upon an other vehicle. Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-1-47 (1988) requires every automobile owner to attach one
license plate to the front of the car and a matching license
plate to the rear. The automobile driven by defendant at the
time of the stop had different plates attached to the front and
rear. Defendant clearly violated the law by operating this car
on the public streets. The officer had both a right and dutyto stop defendant's vehicle because of his significant
registration violation. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The stop was a valid stop based upon objective facts and
not a pretext based upon some subjective intent to search for
drugs. The mere argument that he was stopped to search for
drugs is speculation without support in the record. Defendant
was stopped for violating the law in the officer's presence and
there is no evidence that defendant was stopped for any other
purpose.
When stopped, defendant could not produce a valid
driver's license. He did produce a prior citation that he had
previously been arrested for driving without a license. He
also gave the officer different names. After defendant had
given false information to the officer and had driven, even
though recently ticketed for illegally driving, defendant's
arrest was not an abuse of the officer's statutory discretion
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-165 to -166 (1988), 77-7-2(1)(3)
and 77-7-18 (1990). Obviously, defendant's prior ticket had
not deterred him from driving without a license.
The impoundment of the vehicle was reasonably justified
because defendant was alone, the vehicle had improperly
registered license plates, and could not be left on the
street. See State v. Hvoh. 711 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1985).

Police are justified in inventorying such vehicles at the time
of impoundment. South Dakota v. Qpperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369
(1976); Cadv v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). Based
upon the totality of the circumstances, the officer was
justified in arresting defendant and impounding his car.
The officer testified that he followed departmental
policy and procedures in the vehicle impoundment and in the
subsequent inventory taken. Defendant produced no evidence to
the contrary. Nor does defendant show that the departmental
procedures followed by the officer in some manner offend either
the federal or state constitutions. Defendant complains that
the prosecution failed to introduce "documentation- to support
the officer's testimony. Defendant does not say what
••documentation" should have been produced or what its ultimate
value was. Suffice it to say that defendant failed to
challenge in any way the officer's testimony that he followed
established policy. Having elicited unchallenged testimony of
the officer's adherence to police department policy, the
prosecutor was not required to produce at trial copies of the
written policy or an inventory sheet. If defendant believes .
that these documents were of value to his defense, he should
have asked for them and presented them to the trial court.
Because defendant completely failed to factually challenge the
officer's testimony, we see no need to remand the case for
further findings, as the state suggests.
In State v. Sterqer, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 32 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) this court approved the opening of closed containers
in an inventory search when specifically required by search
guidelines. In this case as in Steroer, evidence was
uncontradicted that the officer followed standardized search
procedures in conducting an inventory of the vehicle's contents.
We affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion
to suppress. Defendant's conviction is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DI
IN AND FOR STATE LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
v.

Case No. 901900313FS
JUDGE LEONARD H. RUSSON

MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ,
Defendant

The defendant, MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ, by and through his
attorney of record, JAMES A. VALDEZ, hereby moves the Court to
suppress all evidence taken from the defendant in violation of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the following grounds:
1)

Search of the vehicle should have been conducted

pursuant search warrant.
2)

No probable cause to stop.

3)

There was a pretext stop and subsequent to arrest there

was no crime in the presence of the officer for which
defendant should of been arrested.
DATED this

day of March, 1990.

torney for Defendant
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The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns
After Never Leaving
JOHN M. BURKOFF*

DEDICATION

This Article is dedicated to the memory of G. Mennen Williams.
I was Justice Williams' law clerk from 1973 to 1975. Not only
did I come to admire and to respect him, but my wife, Nancy, and I
grew to love him. Justice Williams and his wife, Nancy, treated us
like family.
I arrived for my clerkship in May of 1973. Like many, if not
most, newly-minted Michigan Law School graduates, I was cocky,
self-satisfied, and smug. I thought I knew it all. How quickly I
learned otherwise. If for that alone, I had Justice Williams to thank
for my brief (if evanescent) exposure to humility.
But he truly taught me so much more. He taught me about law
and lawyers (and life) in a way that cold reported decisions, musty
casebooks, and my Michigan Law School professors did not—and
could not. Justice Williams taught me by example. He neither lectured nor hectored me. He showed me. He snowed me patience.
He showed me how to exercise the public trust responsibly. He
showed me tolerance. He showed me love. He showed me how not
to become distracted from the constant struggle to search for the
truth in the law.
This Article is about truth. It is about the importance of recognizing that constitutional doctrine must be crafted in such a way that
it beatifies the truth, rather than ignoring it for short-term, resultoriented reasons, however instantly appealing. It will come as no
surprise to those who knew us both, that as close as Justice Williams
and I became, we did not agree on everything. (Sometimes, he was
wrong.) But I know that, whether or not he would have agreed with
my conclusions in this Article— and we would have had some lively
discussions about those conclusions—he would have encouraged
and applauded my attempt to preserve the truth.
Rest in peace, Governor. We miss you.

* Professor of Law, University c^ Pittsburgh. A.B. 1970, J.D. 1973, University of Michigan; LL.M. 1976, Harvard University. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Barbara Moravitz, Class of 1989.
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Oh, what a (angled web we weave,
When first we practice to deceive!**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Chief Justice (then-Justice) Rehnquist once candidly observed
that "the decisions of this Court dealing with the constitutionality of
warrantless searches . . . suggest that this branch of the law is something less than a seamless web." 1 There are, however, few fourth
amendment webs less seamless—more tangled—than the decisional
law and underlying doctrine relating to pretextual fourth amendment activity.
By "pretextual fourth amendment activity," I am referring to
searches or seizures (including arrests) that are undertaken by law
enforcement officers for reasons that do not constitute a proper
legal justification for such activity.2 Such conduct is commonly
called a "pretext," a "sham," or a "subterfuge," but the common
thread is that it can be established that it was undertaken for illegitimate reasons. Although it might seem to the reader who is first encountering this branch of the law a bit strange, if not wholly
perverse, to be informed that some commentators and judges consider such unjustified (by definition) fourth amendment activity to
be nonetheless constitutional under the fourth amendment, that is
indeed the case. 3 Under this view of fourth amendment pretext
doctrine, no cognizable constitutional problem exists when the
problematic activity of law enforcement officers can be described as
if it was within the boundaries of the law, although it can otherwise
be conclusively demonstrated that such a rationalized justification is
a fiction, i.e., that it does not in fact reflect the officers' true reasons
for so acting.
This author most assuredly does not share the point of view that
the Constitution, current fourth amendment cases, or fourth
amendment doctrine countenance or command legitimizing such a
fiction.4 Most federal and state court judges, 'likewise, do not share
the point of view that pretexts are constitutionally irrelevant. 5
** Scott, Marnnon, introduction, canto VI, stanza 17 (1808).
"I will not practice to deceive,/ Yet, to avoid deceit, I mean to learn." Shakespeare, King John, act I, sc. 1, lines 214-15.
1. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973).
2. See BurkofT. Bad Faith Searches, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 71 n.5, 101 n.160
(1982) [hereinafter Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches].
3. See infra text accompanying notes 62-85, 102, 121. Since such commentators and judges have found the activity so described not to be constitutionally objectionable, they have accordingly found such cases to be inappropriate for
application of the exclusionary rule.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 39-45.
5. See infra note 56 and text accompanying note 124.
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The Supreme Court had a golden opportunity during its 19861987 Term to make clear what its position actually is with respect to
the constitutionality of pretexts. Questions relating to the appropriate constitutional significance of fourth amendment pretextual activity were squarely before the Court in the case of Missouri v. Blair.6
Certiorari was granted, briefs were filed, oral argument was heard;
months passed while the parties waited for the Court's decision and,
uliimately, the Court decided not to decide; it dismissed the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted without a single word of
explanation.
It is truly unfortunate that the Blair case was not decided by the
Supreme Court. The facts in Blair posed pretext conundra in a
clear-cut fashion. 7 Nonetheless, the argument in Blair may well have
had a significant effect on the Court. In four other important cases
decided after Blair was argued to the Court, the Supreme Court
handed down decisions where fourth amendment doctrine relating
to pretextual activity was also applied or discussed. 8 These four
cases—cases which reflect the Court's views on all of the important
legal points relating to pretexts that were argued but not decided in
Blair—make clear what has all too often not been clear to some
judges and commentators during the past decade, namely that:
(1) the Supreme Court recognizes that a rinding of unconstitutionality is compelled where evidence is seized on the basis of pretextual
fourth amendment activity; (2) the Supreme Court recognizes that
pretexts exist when law enforcement officers actually act pretextually even when they could have acted lawfully (but in fact did not);
and, (3) the Supreme Court recognizes that the improper motivation of searching or arresting law enforcement officers—their "bad
faith" or the absence thereof—is relevant to fourth amendment pretext analysis.
This Article expands upon these points. It also makes the case
for the continuing recognition and application of a vital, nonfictive
pretext search doctrine. This approach to fourth amendment decision-making will **insure[] that every time a defendant can demonstrate a pretext search or arrest, a court will deal with the pretextual
activity under the law, and not simply ignore it." 9

6. State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), cert, granted sub nom.
Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 689 (1987).
7. For a discussion of the Blair case, see infra text accompanying notes 86-143.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 144-204.
9. Burkoff, Rejoinder: Truth, Justice, and the American Way—Or Professor Haddad's
Hard Choices; 18 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 695, 703 (1985) [hereinafter Burkoff, Rejoinder]
(footnote omitted).
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II.

A.

THE PRETEXT SEARCH DOCTRINE CONTROVERSY

Scott and Its Progeny

In 1978, the Supreme Court decided what has, however inappropriately, become the seminal case on pretexts: Scott v. United
States.10 In Scott, then-Justice Rehnquist offhandedly observed for a
majority of the Court that the issue whether a fourth amendment
violation exists in a given case of questioned law enforcement search
or seizure activity should be resolved exclusively by using, in his
words, "a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to
the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved."11 Such
an objective test is appropriate, Rehnquist opined, because "the fact
that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action."12
Justice Rehnquist did not explain why this remarkable proposition—that law enforcement officers' intent or motivation is irrelevant—should be the case or why application of such an "objective"
test was deemed to be compelled, necessary, or even desirable, as a
test for fourth amendment analysis. The Scott "objective" test language simply appeared as if deus ex machina. Indeed, i* is questionable, to put it mildly, whether the handful of prior Supreme Court
decisions expressly relied upon by Justice Rehnquist to support his
application of an "objective test" actually stood for the supportive
propositions for which they were cited as precedential authority.13
As Professor Wayne LaFave commented in analyzing this authority,
"Justice Rehnquist is certainly correct in stating [in Scott] that the
Court has 'not examined this exact question at great length in any of
our prior opinions,' but it may nonetheless be fairly said that he has
presented a somewhat skewed picture of what the Court had had to
say on this subject."14 Just as important, Rehnquist failed to mention, let alone discuss, any of a number of prior Supreme Court
opinions that had treated law enforcement officers' improper motives for engaging in search or seizure activity as not only relevant
but, in some cases, dispositive of the question of the conduct's
fourth amendment constitutionality.15
10. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
11. Id. at 138 (footnote omitted).
12. Id.
13. For criticism of Justice Rehnquist's use of this precedent, see BurkofF, Bad
Faith Seatches, supta note 2, at 75-76 n 22.
14.

W. I.XFAVF. SFAKC.II AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

§ 1.4(a), at 82 (2d cd 1987).
15. See. eg , South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 V.S. 364, 376 (1976); Brown v.
Illinois, 422 VS. 590, 611 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Wainwrighi v. Cit> of
New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 606-07* (1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Abel v.
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Nonetheless, whatever the legitimacy of its parentage, there is
no denying the fact that the Supreme Court ruled in Scott that analysis of fourth amendment issues should be conducted "objectively."
The question then arises: what does this mean with respect to pretexts? If, indeed, the constitutionality of all fourth amendment activity must be evaluated exclusively "objectively," i.e., in the Scott
Court's words, "without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved," it is problematic whether pretextual
fourth amendment activity can ever be proved. How do you demonstrate a "pretext" "objectively?" More to the point, the question
arises whether such pretexts are indeed unconstitutional in any
event.H> From this perspective, the putative use of an objective test
lor fourth amendment analysis and the law relating to pretexts are
directly and inextricably related. As I have elaborated upon elsewhere,17 if evidence of a searching or arresting officer's pretextual
motives is treated as irrelevant and, hence, inadmissible at suppression hearings (when it is otherwise available), it will be almost impossible to prove the officer's lack of lawful justification to search or
arrest where, as is common, "the state is able to contrive an appropriate legal justification to account for the appearance (but not the
reality) of a questioned search."18
It is possible to avoid reaching this unhappy (to me) conclusion
by recognizing that the Scott Court simply did not—or at least did
not mean to—apply its supposed objective test to the issue of
pretextual fourth amendment activity. After all, the objective test
language in Scott was obiter dictum. The Scott case focused upon the
constitutionality of the conduct of FBI agents who monitored a
court-approved wiretap. The authorizing court order relied upon
by the agents specifically required that the interception of conversations be "minimized" so as to include only those conversations lawt'nited States, 362 U.S. 217, 226, 230 (1960); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,
500 (1958) (Clark, J., dissenting); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467
(1932). See also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 n.4 (1978). See the
discussion of these cases in Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 75-81; W.
LAFAVE, supra note 14, at § 1.4.
16. For the position that they are not unconstitutional, see Haddad, Pretextual
Fourth Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 639 (1985). See
infra text accompanying notes 62-85 for a discussion of Haddad's position.
17. See BurkofF, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Xow You See It. Sow You Don't, 17 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 523, 525-26 (1984) [hereinafter Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine)',
Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 81-82; Burkoff, The Court That Devoured the
Fourth Amendment- The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REV.
151, 190 (1979) [hereinafter Burkoff, Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine).
18. Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 17, at 548.
19. I have argued just this point. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at
83-84,98-100.
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fully subject to interception under the federal wiretap statute*
The FBI agents did not, however, use any selectivity in their inter
ception of conversations; instead, they simply recorded every single
call made over the subject telephone during the interception period
including personal calls, calls concerning employment opportunities, and calls to the weather service.21
Defendant Scott claimed that this absence of minimization \va*
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the constitutionality of this activity despite the absence of apparent minimiza
tion because the agents never reached the point where it wa>
necessary to minimize their interception of calls:
In a case such as this, involving a wide-ranging conspiracy
with a large number of participants, even a seasoned listener would have been hard pressed to determine with any
precision the relevancy of many of the calls before they
were completed. A large number were ambiguous in nature, making characterization virtually impossible until the
completion of these calls. And some of the nonpertinent
conversations were one-time conversations. Since these calls
did not give the agents an opportunity to develop a category of innocent calls which should not have been intercepted, their interception
cannot be viewed as a violation of the minimization requirements.22
In essence, the FBI agents in Scott never had the opportunity to
act upon their arguable intent to act in bad faith—to ignore the minimization requirement—since none of the calls actually intercepted
were 44 non-interceptible" under the Supreme Court's reading of the
law. Hence, the language in Scott about "objective reasonableness"
and "underlying intent or motivation" is simply unnecessary to the
decision. The Scott Court "merely held that improper intent that n
not acted upon does not render unconstitutional an otherwise constitutional search. Since in pretext cases the searching officer has b\
definition acted on his unlawful intent, this reading of Scott harmonizes the case with the Court's continuing concern about
pretexts." 2 *
20. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 130 (1978).
21. United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233, 247 (D.D.C. 1971). "(Tjhe monitoring agents made no attempt to comply with the minimization order of the Court
but listened to and recorded all calls over the [subject 1 telephone. They showed no
regard for the right of privacv and did nothing to avoid unnecessary intrusion."
Scott v. United States, Nos. 74-2097. 74-2098 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1974) quoted in Scott
v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 144 (1978) (Brennan.J., dissenting) (bracketed material in original).
22. 436 V.S. at 142 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
23. Buikoll, Had Faith Search**, supra note 2, at 83-84 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). Sec also Buikoff, Pretext Seanh Doctrine, supra note 17, at 525-27; Note,
Addressing the Pretext Problem: The Role of Subjective Motivation m Establishing Fourth
Amendment Violations, 63 B.U.L. REV. 223, 241 (1983).
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As convenient as this obiter dictum conclusion is for those of us
who would like to reconcile the Scott objective test language with
prior (and subsequent) Supreme Court decisional law stating or implying that pretextual searches and arrests are unconstitutional, 24
the Supreme Court subsequently applied Scott as if it were not obiter
dictum in its 1983 decision in United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez.25
The Villamonte-Marquez case involved the suspicionless boarding of a
vessel, the Henry Morgan II, by customs officers. Then-Justice Rehnquist, the author of the Scott majority opinion, concluded for the majority in Villamonte-Marquez that such random, suspicionless stops
and boardings of vessels "with ready access to the open sea" are
constitutional despite the absence of particularized antecedent justification, at least when they are made by federal agents armed with
the statutory authority to enforce federal vessel documentation
laws.*6 The defendants in Villamonte-Marquez, all of whom were ultimately convicted of various narcotics offenses after the boarding officers discovered marijuana aboard the Henry Morgan II', argued that
the search of their ship was pretextual, and that it was not in fact
made to enforce the vessel documentation laws whose existence
gave rise to the legal and constitutional authority to search without
any antecedent justification. Rather, defendants flatly contended,
"[t]he Henry Morgan II was boarded by the officers of a law enforcement patrol formed for the specific criminal investigatory purpose
of locating boats loaded with marijuana/*-'7
There was, moreover, a good deal of evidence on the record
before the Supreme Court establishing that defendants' pretext argument had some merit to it. Not the least of the evidence marshalled by defendants was the fact that a state police narcotics
investigator who boarded the Henry Morgan II with the federal customs agents conceded the truth of defendants' claim, that the officers
were boarding all of the ships at anchor in the ship channel looking
for narcotics 2H Justice Rehnquist was not, however, interested in the
merit—or lack thereof—of this contention. Rather, he summarily
rejected the pretext argument itself as untenable, ruling in a cursory
footnote that:
Respondents . . . contend . . . that because the customs of24. See, e.g., United Slates v. ^eflcowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1921) ("An arrest
may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence."); cases cited in supra note 14
and infra notes 144-204.
25. 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
26. I criticized this conclusion as a matter of fourth amendment doctrine without regard to the pretext issue in BurkoiF, When Is A Search Xot A 'Search?' Fourth
Amendment Doublethink, 15 U. Toi.. L. RF.V. 515, 541-46 (1984).
27. Brief for the Respondents at 6, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462
U.S. 579 (1983).
28. Id. at 9. See also Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 17, at 530-32.
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ficers were accompanied by a Louisiana state policeman,
and were following an informant's tip that a vessel in the
ship channel was thought to be carrying marijuana, they
may not rely on the statute authorizing boarding for inspection of the vessel's documentation. This line of reasoning was rejected in a similar situation in Scott v. United
States . . ., and we again reject it.29
In other words, a majority of the Villamonte-Marquez Court held
that because the Scott decision dictated the use of an objective test to
gauge the validity of fourth amendment activity, the admittedly unlawful30 (subjective) motive of the boarding officers in VillamonteMarquez to undertake a pretextual search was simply irrelevant to
the constitutional analysis because a document search of the vessel
could have lawfully been made under federal regulations. Applied in
this manner, the Scott language made it totally impossible for the
Villamonte-Marquez defendants to present a cognizable case of pretext, as the true reasons the vessel search was undertaken were
treated as wholly irrelevant—the truth was less important to the
Court than the fictive objective appearance of the activity as it could
have been interpreted when viewed in the most charitable, if inaccurate, possible light.31
Professor LaFave has noted that the Supreme^Court has also
relied upon Scott in one case besides Villamonte-Marquez?2 the 1985
decision of Maryland v. Macon?* This is nominally true since the
Scott decision was cited in Macon, but Macon is not a case that deals
with pretext issues. In Macon, the Supreme Court ruled that a plainclothes, undercover detective who purchased two obscene
magazines with a marked fifty dollar bill, left the store and then immediately returned to retrieve the bill (without, it might be pointed
out for the record, returning the change for the fifty dollars he had
previously received) was not subject to any fourth amendment restrictions on 'his conduct* as he had not "seized" the magazines
within the meaning of the term "seizure" in the fourth amendment.
The reason there was no "seizure," Justice O'Connor stated for the
29. 462 U.S. at 584 n.3 (citation omitted).
30 Normally, fourth amendment activity must be supported by probable
cause. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985). Hence, a search for marijuana ordinarily would require the existence of probable cause which, as the
Supreme Court acknowledged, did not exist in the Villamonte-Marquez case. The
parties further agreed that not even the lesser antecedent justification of "reasonable suspicion" existed as justification for the search of the Henry Morgan II.
31. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist ignored even the questionable objective appearance of this activiiv. I he record was replete with objective evidence of pretext,
wholly aside from the Louisiana state policeman's subjective concession of pretext.
See BuikoH, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 17, at 530-32.
32. YV 1-AFAVE, supra note 14, § 1.4, at 81 n.2.
33. 472 U.S. 463 (1985).

1989]

PRETEXT SEARCH DOCTRINE

371

majority, was that the seller had "voluntarily transferred any possessory interest he may have had in the magazines to the purchaser
upon the receipt of the funds." 34 Defendant Macon argued, however, that this transfer of funds was not what it appeared to be, i.e., it
was not really a bona fide commercial transaction. The undercover
agent clearly neither intended—nor permitted—the buyer to keep
the fifty dollars he had tendered; hence, defendant urged, the
agent's act of obtaining the magazines at issue should be treated not
as a purchase, but as an involuntary "seizure" that must be justified
under the fourth amendment. 35 The Macon majority disagreed with
this contention, ruling in response that:
This argument cannot withstand scrutiny. Whether a
Fourth Amendment violation has occurred "turns on an
objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the
facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,'* Scott
v. United States, . . . and not on the officer's actual state of
mind at the time the challenged action was taken. . . . Objectively viewed, the transaction was a sale in the ordinary
course of business. The sale is not retrospectively transformed into a warrantless seizure by virtue of the officer's
subjective intent to retrieve the purchase money to use as
evidence. 36
As in Villamonte-Marquez, the Scott language was used by the Macon Court to render the true reasons why the conduct in question
took place (criminal investigation not ordinary commercial
34. Id. at 469.
35. Brief for the Respondent at 10-11, Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463
(1985). Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union made the argument most
clearly:
As no appreciable time had lapsed between the officer's "purchase'* of the
magazines and his recapture of the money, it borders on sophistry to assert, as [the state of Maryland] does . . . that once [Defendant], on his
employer's behalf, had voluntarily surrendered possession of the
magazines in exchange for their purchase price, he had relinquished all
interest in the merchandise, retaining an interest only in the money.
Hypertechnical applications of principles of property law may not be used
to defeat close scrutiny of police conduct in obtaining evidence.
Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Civil Liberties Union at 6 (citations omitted),
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985). Defendant was attempting to establish
this point in order to be able to make the further argument that since this transaction was indeed a "seizure," the law enforcement officer needed a warrant to make
it.
36. Macon, 472 U.S. at 471 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor added, however, that the recapture of the $50 bill may well have been an unconstitutional
seizure. Nonetheless, she stated that "[assuming, arguendo, that the retrieval of the
money incident to the arrest was wrongful, the proper remedy is restitution or suppression of the $50 bill as evidence of the purchase, not exclusion from evidence of
ihe previously purchased magazines." Id.
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purchase) irrelevant. That is not to say, however, unlike in Yi>
lamonte-Marquez, that if the true reason for the acquisition of the
magazines in Macon was considered (they were actually "seized" as
part of a criminal investigation), rather than the operative "fiction"
that was used (this was simply an ordinary commercial transaction),
the seizure was pretextual or otherwise unconstitutional. Rather, if
the Court had assessed this transaction on the basis of the actual
facts, objective and subjective, it would have been forced to address
the then-dispositive issue whether a warrantless "seizure" of obscene materials in this fashion was justified in these circumstances.
If it was, there was no pretext. Hence, the application of the Scott
language in Macon, unlike the application of Scott in Villamonte-Maiquez, does no damage to the concern for the deterrence of pretextual
fourth amendment activity since the undercover officer in Macon was
not necessarily acting for improper reasons.37
Accordingly, the only Supreme Court decision that truly threatens the proposition that pretextual fourth amendment activity is inappropriate and unconstitutional is Villamonte-Marquez. But,
although the Court has not applied the Scott objective test language
directly in any case other than Villamonte-Marquez, Villamonte-Marqua
is, nonetheless, not the Court's last, only, or most important word
on this subject. 38
B.

Pretext Commentary
L

My Position

In a number of articles published since the Scott decision was
handed down, 3 " I have, in Professor LaFave's words, "sounded the
alarm,*'40 trying to make two basic and independent points about
that decision's supposed adoption of an "objective" fourth amendment lest and the impact of such a test upon the proof—and relevance—of pretextual search and seizure activity. First, I have
argued that Supreme Court decisions handed down before and after
the Scott decision have neither uniformly adopted nor applied an objective fourth amendment test as was seemingly dictated in Scott, despite the fact that the isolated opinion of Villamonte-Marquez^
states—or implies—the contrary. That is simply to say that the case
law is decidedly ambiguous and inconsistent on this subject. In37. See supra-iexi accompanying note 2.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 144-207.
39. Burkoff, Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, supra note 17, at 181-90; Burkoff,
Pretext Searches, 9 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 25 (1982); Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches,
supra note 2; Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 17; Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra
note 9.
40. See VV. U F . W E , supra note 14, § 1.4(a), at 83.
41. For a discussion of United Stales v. Villamonte-Marquez, see supra text accompaming notes 25-31.

1989]

PRETEXT SEARCH DOCTRINE

373

deed, a number of Supreme Court decisions have been handed
down since Scott—and continue to come down—which, unlike Scottt
clearly apply fourth amendment doctrine in ways that are far from
objective, treating the subjective motives of law enforcement officers engaged in searches and seizures as important, if not dispositive, constitutional considerations, particularly as they relate to
claims of pretextual activity.42
Second, I have also argued that, assuming that pretexts are unconstitutional, the availability of an inquiry into the motives of
searching or arresting law enforcement officers is not only desirable,
but critically necessary in order to insure that law enforcement officers generally will be deterred, through the application of the exclusionary rule, from engaging in pretextual fourth amendment
activity. By advocating the continued use of such a subjective "badfaith" test, 43 it is important to point out that I do not urge its use as
a replacement for an objective test. To the contrary, I firmly believe
that its most beneficial—even necessary—use is exactly as it is being
used today in most state courts across the country44—as a vital supplement to the objective test. 45
2.

Professor LaFave s Position

Professor LaFave has responded to these arguments by agreeing with me that given the facts in Scott set forth in the lower court
opinion and the prior decisions which were not discussed in the majority opinion, the Scott decision "can hardly be read as a definitive
analysis settling that in all circumstances fourth amendment suppression issues are to be resolved without assaying 4the underlying
intent or motivation of the officers involved.' " 46 LaFave nonetheless argues that such a reading of Scott, although not legally compelled, "is precisely what the rule ought to be." 47 The reason that
42. See infra text accompanying notes 144-204.
43. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2. But see VV. LAFAVE, supra note
14, § 1.4, at 80 (calling the phrase "bad faith" a somewhat inaccurate characterization, but nonetheless using it as the title of the appropriate subsection of his
treatise).
44. See infra text accompanying note 56.
45. The protocol for assessing fourth amendment pretexts should be as
follows:
Initially, a court should determine whether a search is objectively constitutional or unconstitutional. If the search is objectively unconstitutional, a
court need proceed no further. If, however, the search is objectively constitutional, the court must next determine (if the issue is raised) whether
the search was a "bad faith" search.
Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 116. See also Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note
9, at 696, 703.
46. VV. LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 1.4(a), at 83 (emphasis original).
47. Id.
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such an objective approach is the appropriate analysis in pretext
cases, LaFave contends, is that
the proper basis of concern is not with why the officer deviated from the usual practice in this case but simply that he
did deviate. It is the fact of the departure from the accepted
way of handling such cases which makes the officer's conduct arbitrary, and it is the arbitrariness which in this context constitutes the Fourth Amendment violation.48
Moreover, LaFave argues that "[underlying the Scott rule . . . is the
sound notion . . . that 'sending state and federal courts on an expedition into the minds of police officers would produce a grave and
fruitless misallocation of judicial resources.' "4f)
However, LaFave's analysis does not, unlike the Supreme Court
in Villamonte-Marquez, treat fourth amendment pretextual activity as
constitutionally irrelevant. Far from it. Rather, LaFave's point is
that pretexts are unconstitutional, but that the existence of such unconstitutional pretextual activity should be assessed (exclusively)
objectively. Accordingly, to assess constitutionality in a case of
questionable conduct, LaFave has proposed that the question that
should be asked and answered by the appropriate court is whether
"the Fourth Amendment activity 'was carried out in accordance with
standard procedures in the local police department.' " 50
I have criticized LaFave's analysis on this point at length elsewhere. 51 Suffice it to say that I agree that the use of LaFave's objective approach is a sensible first step to take in determining whether
law enforcement officers have committed a fourth amendment violation. 52 What is difficult to understand is why such an objective approach should also be the final—and exclusive—step in a pretext
analysis.
'»
The argument that subjective inquiries into law enforcement officers' motives are difficult or fruitless53 totally begs the question
whether they are nonetheless constitutionally appropriate or even
necessary. 54 Indeed, as Professor James Haddad pointed out, "The
48. Id.. § 1.4(c), at 94 (emphasis in original).
49. Id. at 96 (quoting Massachusetts v. Painien, 389 VS. 560, 565 (1968)
(White, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari as improvidently granted)).
50. Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 374-75 (1976) (emphasis original)).
51. BurkofF, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 107-11. See also Haddad, supra
note 16, at 650-51.
52. See supra note 45 and text accompanying notes 43-45.
53. See supra text accompanying note 49; W. LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 1.4(e), at
96 ("there is no reason to believe that courts can with any degree of success determine in which instances the police had an ulterior motive."); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 436-37 (1974).
54. "If justice requires [aj fact to be ascertained, the difficulty of doing so is no
ground for refusing to try." O.VV. HOLMES, THE COMMON L\W 48 (1881).
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worst that one could say [about a subjective inquiry] is that under
such an approach, because of the difficulty of proof, the prosecution
would sometimes benefit from evidence discovered through pretextual fourth amendment activity."55 How different is this difficulty of
proof from the difficulty the defense ordinarily has on every suppression motion? Moreover, the fruitlessness argument is simply,
soundly, and empirically disproved by the scores of federal and state
court decisions in which such motivational evidence has been found
to be readily available (and, accordingly, where a finding of pretext
has been treated as dispositive of the constitutionality of the
search).5"
55. Haddad, supra note 16, at 685. Haddad adds:
The typical criticism of Professor Burkoff's approach is quite unsophisticated. Ignoring the many areas of constitutional law analysis where the
Court has assigned motive a role, or where the Court has denied it a role
only after extensive discussion, the critics often dismiss, in a sentence or
two, the [subjective] methodology of resolving pretextual fourth amendment claims. . . . But if constitutional law sometimes makes motive determinative of outcome—even in contexts where the search for motive is
more difficult than in the pretextual search context—difficulty of ascertainment cannot suffice to defeat the use of motive in pretextual search
analysis.
Id. at 681-82 (footnotes omitted).
56. See, e.g.. United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) ("Whether an arrest is a mere pretext to search turns on the motivation or primary purpose of the arresting officers. . . . Courts have found improper
moiivation where the defendant is arrested for a minor offense so as to allow police
to search for evidence of some other unrelated offense for which police lack probable cause to arrest or search.").
For some of the many recently reported decisions suppressing evidence based
upon a finding of pretext, see, e.g., United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546 (1 1th Cir.
1987); United Slates v. Merchant, 760 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1985), cert, granted, 478
U.S. 1003 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 615 (1987); United States v. Johnson, 722
K.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Prim. 698 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1983);
t'niied States v. Ospina, 618 F. Supp. 1486 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Millio, 588 F. Supp. 45 (W.D.N.Y. 1984); United Slates v. Abbott, 584 F. Supp. 442
(W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 749 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Belcher, 577 F. Supp.
1241 (E.D. Va. 1983); United Stales v. Nelson, 511 F. Supp. 77 (W.D. Tex. 1980);
t'niied States v. Keller, 499 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. III. 1980); United States v. Sanford,
493 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C. 1980); Spann v. State. 494 So. 2d 716 (Ala. Crim. App.
1985), aff'd on other grounds, 494 So. 2d 719 (Ala. 1986); Guzman v. State, 283 Ark.
112, 672 S.W.2d 656 (1984); People v. Howard, 162 Cal. App. 3d 8, 208 Cal. Rptr.
353 (1984); People v. Dickson, 144 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 192 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1983);
People v. Albritton, 138 Cal. App. 3d 79, 187 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1982); People v.
Reynolds, 672 P.2d 529 (Colo. 1983); State v. Miller, 420 A.2d 181 (Del. Super. Ct.
1980); Nealy v. State, 400 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd on other grounds,
419 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1982); Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923,
tnt. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981); Gaston v. State, 155 Ga. App. 337, 270 S.E.2d 877
(1980); State v. Knight, 63 Haw. 90, 621 P.2d 370 (1980); People v. Reincke, 84 111.
App. 3d 222, 405 N.E.2d 430 (1980); State v. Killcrease, 379 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980);
Stale v. Harris, 504 So. 2d 156. (La. Ct. App. 1987); Smith v. Stale, 48 Md. App.
425, 427 A.2d 1064 (1981); Manalansan v. Slate. 45 Md. App. 667. 415 A.2d 308
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Furthermore, LaFave's argument that only the objective "fact"
of a law enforcement officer's arbitrary deviation from the "usual
practice" or "standard procedures" should be relevant to fourth
amendment pretext analysis raises more problems than it resolves.
Not only do a police department's usual practices or standard procedures (where they exist) have no constitutional status per se, they
may indeed be unconstitutional.57 Nor is a concern about law enforcement arbitrariness the only doctrinal concern the Supreme
Court must consider in fourth amendment cases. When a law enforcement officer acts pretextualiy, the Court must be equally or
more concerned about the simple fact that it has failed to get the
message across to the officer that he or she needed a lawful justification for acting before fourth amendment activity could be undertaken. In other words, not only has the law enforcement officer who
acts pretextualiy acted arbitrarily,58 he or she has also acted (by definition) for reasons which he or she should have known do not justify
such conduct. Such illegal conduct should—must—be deterred.
The Supreme Court has made it crystal clear on many occasions
(1980); People v. Siegel, 95 Mich. App. 594, 291 N.W.2d 134 (1980); State v. Blair.
691 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1985), cert, granted, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480
V.S. 698 (1987); Stale v. Carlson, 198 Mont. 113, 644 P.2d 498 (1982); Hatley v.
State, 100 New 214, 678 P.2d 1160 (1984); State v. Sidebotham, 124 N.H. 682,474
A.2d 1377 (1984); People v. Pace, 65 N.Y.2d 684, 481 N.E.2d 250, 491 N.Y.S.2d
618 (1985); People v. Llopis, 125 A.D.2d 416, 509 N.Y^.2d 135, (N.Y. App. Div.
1986); People v. Auletta, 88 A.D.2d 867, 452 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1982); People
v.Castro, 125 Misc. 2d 15, 479 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1984); People v. Griffin, 116
Misc. 2d 751, 456 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1982); State v. Hall, 52 N.C. App. 492.
279S.E.2d Ml,cert.denied, 304 N.C. 198, 215 S.E.2d 104 (1981); Commonwealth v.
Landamus. 333 Pa. Super. 382, 482 A.2d 619 (1984); Commonwealth v. Corbin.
322 Pa. Super. 271, 469 A.2d 615 (1983); State v. Crabtree, 655 S.W.2d 173
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); Black v. State, 739 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim App. 1987):
King v. State, 733 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. App. 1987); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 739 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987) (en banc); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); McMillan
v. State, 609 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); State v. Rice, 717 P.2d 695 (Utah
1986); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d
264 (Utah 1985); State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983); Hart v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 283. 269 S.E.2d 806 (1980); State v. Loewen, 97 Wash. 2d 562, 647
P.2d 489 (1982); State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980); State v.
Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980); State v. Daugherty, 94 Wash. 2d
263, 616 P.2d 649 (1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 958 (1981); Brown v. State, 738 P.2d
1092 (Wyo. 1987). See also citations collected at Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra
note 2, at 113 n.213.
Some stale and federal courts have, ironically', adopted Professor LaFave's rationale for rejecting the use of a subjective pretext test, i.e. this type of analysis is
fruitless, when pretextual fourth amendment activity was already established on the
record!
57. See BurkofT, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 107-11.
58. Moreover, an arbitrary search (in the sense of one deviating from usual
practices) may not be unconstitutional. See, e.g.. United Stales v. Caceres, 440 U.S.
741, 755-57 (1979); Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2. at 110.
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in the recent past that its principal or only reason for applying an
exclusionary rule to remedy fourth amendment violations is the
general deterrence of police officers.59 Only the use of a subjective
pretext test serves to deter those police officers who have no intention of following the law, but are nonetheless "savvy" enough to
make their conduct appear (objectively) as if it is lawful. These are
the police officers, for example, who stop cars or boats to look for
narcotics and who later sit in court while a prosecutor argues a fiction, namely that such stops were lawful because the stops were in
fact regulatory, undertaken in order to enforce the traffic or registration, not narcotics, laws. Only 4i[t]he use of a subjective pretext
analysis carries with it a simple and understandable, if not classic,
general deterrent message: to search, you must act for the reasons
that justify the search/' 60
An example I have used before may be useful to illustrate this
point:
We do not want to deter the searching police officer who
honestly and forthrightly acts to search for drugs on the
basis of his recognition of the odor of marijuana. We do,
however, want to deter the searching police officer who
searches for wholly improper reasons using a search for
drugs as a pretext. Since the objective conduct and circumstances might well appear exactly the same in both cases,
the only way to assess accurately when an improper search
has occurred and thus the only way to deter police officers
from engaging in such improper activities is to focus on the
searching officer's subjective intent. Such a subjective focus to exclusionary doctrine should serve to "instruct" the
police generally that such an improper intent is just that—
improper—and will accordingly, result in rendering a
search unconstitutional no matter how pristine it might
otherwise objectively, fortuitously appear.61
3. Professor Haddad s Position
Professor James Haddad takes a completely different approach
to the subject of pretexts. 62 He argues, contrary to my and to Professbr LaFave's position, that there is absolutely no ambiguity in
Supreme Court decisions relating to pretextual fourth amendment
59. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1250
(1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
rrh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 404 U.S. 338 (1974).
60. Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 702.
61. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 111-12.
62. See generally Haddad, supra note 16; Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptiom, Claims
of Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. 8C CRIMINOLOGY 198, 204-14
(1977).
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activity. Rather, Haddad claims that what he calls "the hard-choia
approach . . . is the only approach to the pretext problem that tht
Supreme Court has used consistently/' 63 By the "hard-choice aj>
proach," Haddad is referring to his theory that
the Supreme Court has consistently taken into account the
possibility of pretextual fourth amendment activity in determining whether to expand a particular fourth amendment limitation upon police conduct. Sometimes it has left
police practices untouched, sometimes it has narrowed the
scope of police practices; always it has considered governmental and individual interests and not just pretext
possibilities. 04
To clarify his point, Haddad contrasts his "hard-choice" approach to what he calls the "case-by-case" approach to pretexts
wherein "courts examine pretext claims on a case-by-case basis, excluding the product of the fourth amendment activity if they find
that officers exercised the [search or seizure] power pretextualiy."65
In contrast to the case-by-case approach, Haddad argues that the
Supreme Court should—and does—simply craft its fourth amend
ment doctrine in the form of general rules, forged with the recognition that pretexts should be deterred thereby. Since, accordingly,
pretexts are only to be considered by the Supreme Court in the crafting of general rules, when a pretext is apparent on the facts of a
particular case, lower courts must, Haddad counsels, grjf their teeth
and simply ignore it. 66
Haddad further subdivides the case-by-case approach to pretexts into two sub-categories: my approach, described previously,67
which he titles the "individual motivation" approach,68 and
63.
64.
65.
66.

Haddad, supra note 16, at 653 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 673.
Id. at 649.
This is no overstatement. See, e.g., Haddad, supra note 16, at 692:
After courts have reexamined various fourth amendment rules under
the hard-choice approach, eliminating some, narrowing some, and leaving
some unmodified, possibilities for pretextual use will remain. Courts have
eliminated roving patrol license check stops, for example. They could
limit the power to enter a suspect's home under the authority of a dated
warrant. But we know that they will not prevent the police from stopping
speeding motorists. Because this is so, under the hard-choice approach the police will always have an opportunity to stop speeding motorists in the hope of observing
evidence of a robbery in plain view. The hard-choice approach says 'so be it. "
Id. (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 39-45.
68. Haddad, supra note 16, at 681 passim. Professor Haddad concedes, as he
must, that this approach is not just mine, indeed that "(mjany lower courts have
adopted this motivation approach." Id. at 649 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 693
("1 must acknowledge that hundreds of opinions from other courts agree with [Professor Burkofr.s] basic approach.").
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LaFave's approach, 69 which ignominiously untitled, Haddad accurately describes as focusing upon "whether the police departed
from standard procedures." 70 Professor Haddad generously contributes to my continuing legal education by spending fifty-four
pages dissecting, explaining, and criticizing my approach,71 but simply dismisses LaFave's approach out-of-hand, in his words, "because
1 am not sure how it would operate/* 72
I have very briefly responded to Professor Haddad's criticisms
elsewhere.73 I think he was wrong in 1985 when he argued that no
prior Supreme Court decision had ever recognized the existence of
a pretext search doctrine, or at least a doctrine which could be applied in individual cases. 74 More important, whatever the true import of Supreme Court precedents, I thought then and think now
that he is dead wrong when he argues that use of my subjective pretext analysis is inappropriate as a matter of sensible fourth amendment policy. Haddad summarized his complaints about my
approach as follows:
The individual motivation methodology punishes the prosecution where an officer has acted within the letter of the
law to further the laudable goal of obtaining incriminating
evidence. More importantly, an individual motivation
methodology shifts the focus away from the most important issues: the existence and scope of fourth amendment
limitations. Unlike the hard-choice approach, it tends to
inhibit critical reassessment and deserved expansion of
fourth amendment limitations.75
I have three problems with this analysis. First, a law enforcement officer who is acting pretextualiy simply is not acting "within
the letter of the law,"76 a point that Haddad ultimately is moved to
69. See supra text accompanying notes 46-61.
70. Haddad, supra note 16, at 650 (footnote omitted). As noted previously,
because LaFave feels that the Scott decision provides the language, if not the analysis, which underlies his approach, it is typically referred to as the "objective" analysis in contrast to my "subjective" analysis.
71. Haddad, supra note 16. (Authorial aside: I am teasing, of course, Jim, and
appreciate the many kind comments you also had to offer about my work.)
72. Id. at 650 (footnote omitted). Haddad does, however, seemingly associate
himself with my criticisms of LaFave's approach. See id. at 650 n.43, 675-76, 68185.
73. See Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9. Professor LaFave has merely consigned
Haddad to citation in a footnote. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 1.4(a), at 81 n.3.
74. See Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 695-99.
75. Haddad, supra note 16, at 681.
76. For example, in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the
Supreme Court held constitutional suspicionless automobile inventory searches
that are not "a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive." Id. at 376.
Hence, if a law enforcement officer undertakes an automobile inventory search as a
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concede. 77 Second, unless we are to stand the Constitution on its
head, it is obviously not "laudable" for a law enforcement officer to
attempt to obtain incriminating evidence by pretextual, i.e., constitutionally unjustified, means. To hold otherwise is essentially to argue
that the Bill of Rights and interpretive judicial decisions need not be
followed because good ends justify bad (unconstitutional) means.78
Nor are all police investigatory ends good ones. Treating pretexts
as if they were "laudable" would often serve to "cover up" discriminatory police activity.79
Finally, Haddad's criticisms of the subjective approach to pretexts are off base. Haddad essentially compares and contrasts all of
his approach and only part of mine, neglecting the fact that my subjective approach is designed—and has often been used80—not to
supplant his desired "hard-choice" reassessment of fourth amendment doctrine, but rather to supplement it.KI In fairness, Haddad
does ultimately acknowledge that "[o]f course, the Court could still
reexamine various fourth amendment doctrines while simultaneously retaining an individual motivation approach."82 He nonetheless ultimately dismisses this possibility because, in his words: "I
believe, however, that the availability of an individual motivation approach serves as a 'crutch.* It allows the Court to justify a particular
police practice by declaring . . . that the Court will deal with abuses
of the power on a case-by-case basis."83
pretext concealing an investigatory motive, that clearly is not an ae\ undertaken
"within the letter of the law." See Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 699-700.
77. As Haddad generously concludes his article, "Professor BurkoflF's articles
have made me realize that to assert that . . . an improperly motivated officer acts
within the boundaries of an established fourth amendment doctrine begs the question." Haddad, supra note 16, at 693.
78. "Law enforcement officers cannot break down doors without probable
cause, rummage through homes indiscriminately, or arrest anyone they want without sufficient justification at law—even if they are honestly looking for criminal evidence in the process." Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 700.
79. See, e.g.. People v. Castro, 125 Misc. 2d 15, 479 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (Sup. Ct.
1984) ("it appears that members of the squad patrolling in minority neighborhoods
may use the pretext of (investigating) possible taxi crime as an excuse for stopping
gypsy cabs and searching the passengers with the hope of finding guns or other
contraband").
80. See supra citations at note 56.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45, and text accompanying note 52.
82. Haddad. supra note 16, at 688.
83. Id. at 688-89 (citations omitted). Haddad adds: "The more 'outrageous'
the pretextual use of a power, the more likely a defense lawyer will argue pretext
and will fail to argue that a court should narrow the underlying power." Id. at 689.
It is difficult to understand why, however, the reasonably capable defense attorney
would not—and should not be able to—make both arguments. Under Professor
Haddad's analysis, only the latter argument would be available to defense counsel
who, arguing at the suppression court level, would be unlikely (to put it mildly) to
hinge his or her whole defense on attempting to convince a suppression court to
establish a new constitutional rule.
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This is an odd argument. If Haddad is arguing that the availability of such a case-by-case approach (mine or LaFave's) has in fact
served as a "crutch" for the Supreme Court in the past, then he is
effectively confessing error as to his earlier argument that Supreme
Court precedent reveals the prior, unequivocal rejection of that approach.84 If Haddad is arguing instead that the adoption of such a
tase-by-case approach would serve as a "crutch" if and when it is ever
used, it is difficult to imagine why that would—or should—be so.
Since there is no dispute over the fact that the subjective proof of
pretext can be exceedingly difficult for defense counsel to make, it is
hard to imagine why the Supreme Court would rely on that unlikely
possibility as a rationale for otherwise crafting the main body of its
fourth amendment law so as to ignore the threat of pretextual activity altogether. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, "[t]he fact that
pretexts are difficult for defense counsel to establish except in exceptional cases should give the Supreme Court additional incentive
to make 'hard choices' as to the desirable scope of fourth amendment powers as a generic matter. OD
III.

MISSOURI

V.

BL.UR

The Supreme Court had before it during its 1986-1987 Term
the ideal case in which to adopt, elucidate, or refine its position on
the proper constitutional import of these pretext search issues. The
case was Missouri v. Blair, in which certiorari was granted in January
of 1986. 86 The facts in Blair lent themselves to analysis in paradigmatic fashion of all of the pretext issues discussed above.
A.

The Facts

On November 24, 1981, Kansas City, Missouri police officers
discovered the dead body of 59-year-old Carl Lindstedt in a park
lagoon. Lindstedt had been bound hand and foot and shot. The
only solid evidence found near the scene of the crime was a palm
print discovered behind the passenger door on the victim's truck,
which was discovered parked a quarter mile away from the body.
The search for Lindstedt's killer got nowhere.87
On January 22, 1982, two months after Lindstedt's body was
found, an unknown tipster telephoned an investigator in the county
prosecutor's office and reported that she had talked to some chil84. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
85. Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 701 (footnote omitted).
86. 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 698 (1987).
87. Facts are drawn from the Missouri Supreme Court's opinion, State v. Blair,
691 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Mo. 1985), from the unpublished Missouri Court of Appeals
opinion, State v. Blair, No. WD35622 (Mo. Ct. App. July 3, 1984), and from the
Briefs of the parties to the Supreme Court.
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dren who said that they had overheard members of the Blair famih
bragging about their involvement in the murder. Based upon this
double hearsay tip, palm prints on file of three of the Blair family
members were examined by the police and were found not to match
the print found at the scene of the crime. The police did not, however, have a palm print of the fourth Blair family member, Zola
Blair, on file. So, on January 23, 1982, a Kansas City homicide
detective issued a so-called "pick up" order to bring Zola Blair in to
the stationhouse for questioning about the Lindstedt murder. The
detective, according to the Missouri Supreme Court, summarizing
the trial court's finding and testimony, "did not ask for a homicide
arrest or search warrant because he believed there was not enough
evidence to support a warrant.""8
On February 5, 1982, Zola Blair was picked up by the Kansas
City police. She was taken to the downtown homicide unit, booked
for homicide, detained overnight in jail, interrogated, and her palm
and finger prints were taken. After denying any knowledge of the
murder during interrogation, she was released at 10:45 a.m. the
next day. Three days later, however, Blair was arrested and booked
once again for homicide—her palm print taken on February 5, 1982,
had matched the one found at the scene of the crime.
After Zola Blair's arrest, her attorney moved to suppress the
palm print taken from his client after she was "picked up" by the
Kansas City police as well as some incriminating statements she
made after being confronted with the evidence cff the matching
prints. His rationale for suppression was that the police lacked
probable cause to "pick up" Zola Blair for homicide before they had
matched her palm print, the "pick up" was therefore unconstitutional, and the print and subsequent statements were, as a result,
suppressive fruits of this unconstitutional act.
This suppression argument was not difficult to win. The United
States Supreme Court has made it clear that, whatever the police
call it, when you "pick up" someone, take them to the stationhouse
and hold them for questioning, that's an "arrest" (a "seizure" in
fourth amendment terminology).89 And to make an arrest, the police must have "probable cause" to believe that the arrestee committed a crime. 90
In Zola Blair's case, it is clear that the police did not have probable cause with respect to her participation in the Lindstedt murder
88. State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Mo. 1985), cert, panted sub nom. Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 V.S. 698 (1987).
89. See, e.g.. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) ("detention for
custodial interrogation—regardless of" its label—intrudes so severely on interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.").
90. U.S. CONST, amend. IV. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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before they picked her up and took her palm print. They only had
an unknown informant's uncorroborated, double hearsay tip that
Zola Blair's family was bragging about the murder.91 This kind of
unsupported accusation is not—and can never be—enough, by itself, to establish probable cause to arrest someone. If it were
deemed to be enough, probable cause would become a meaningless
requirement; anyone could arrange the arrest of a person he or she
disliked simply by calling the nearest police station and anonymously accusing that person of committing a crime. Worse still, police officers would never have to uncover any real probable cause
information in order to make an arrest because they could always
use as justification the anonymous tip they (allegedly) received that
implicated the arrestee. Indeed, in Zola Blair's case, after her attorney made his motion to suppress the evidence against her, the prosecution ultimately conceded that the informant's tip was not enough
lo establish probable cause to arrest her—and the Missouri courts
readily agreed with this conclusion. 92
Given this expurgated factual recitation, the Blair case, while
troubling because it raises the possibility that someone who may
have been at a murder scene may go untried for lack of admissible
evidence, raises no original or sophisticated fourth amendment issues. This would be true even if we knew (which we do not) that Zola
Blair was actually involved in the Lindstedt murder. As Justice
Scalia has recently acknowledged for the Supreme Court, "There is
nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us
all/*93
But, the plot thickens as a few additional facts are added to the
tale. When the police arrived at Zola Blair's home (actually Zola
Blair's mother's home where Zoia lived) to execute the "pick up"
order on February 5, 1982, they allegedly saw a car illegally parked
outside the house. Upon radioing the address back to the dispatcher before entering the house, they discovered that Zola herself
was not only a murder "suspect," she was also the subject of an
outstanding municipal parking violation "warrant." (Actually, no
physical warrant existed, just an entry noting the existence of the
parking violation in a computerized file.)
91. The state also alleged that the police had found the victim's sofa in the
home of James Blair. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049
(1986). But no tie was demonstrated between 7ola Blair and this residence or the
sofa, and this fact was not considered relevant by the Missouri courts.
92. "In this case, it is undisputed that the police lacked probable cause to
arrest defendant on the homicide charge. . . ." State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259, 261
(Mo. 1985); State v. Blair, No. WD35622 (Mo. Ct. App. July 3, 1984) ("it was conceded that there existed no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant").
93. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1155 (1987).
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As a result, when Zola Blair's defense attorney successfully argued in the Missouri courts that the unknown informant's double
hearsay tip did not establish probable cause to arrest her for homicide, the prosecution responded that, in that event, the informant's
tip should be treated as irrelevant because Zola Blair was arrested
for the parking violation. Since she was lawfully under arrest for
something, the argument went, her palm prints were constitutional
acquired.
The Missouri courts were not, however, so easily deceived
Blair's defense attorney won his pretrial suppression motion in the
trial court and had it affirmed by the Missouri Court of Appeals and
the Missouri Supreme Court. He won because the Missouri courts
recognized what was absolutely crystal clear on the record before
them, namely that Zola Blair was arrested for homicide, not bad
parking. The prosecution, the Missouri courts concluded, brought
up the parking violation "warrant" simply as a pretext to justify her
otherwise unlawful arrest for homicide. As the Missouri Supreme
Court ruled, even "lajssuming an arrest for the parking violation,
the arrest, in the circumstances of this case, was at best a pretext
employed to gather evidence on an unrelated homicide."94
On the facts, it is rather hard, if not impossible, to quibble with
the Missouri Supreme Court's conclusion: it was a homicide detective
who ordered Zola Blair's "pick up," she was given Miranda warnings
(people booked for traffic offenses in this jurisdiction are not given
such warnings), she was taken to the downtown homicfde unit (people
booked for parking violations in this jurisdiction are taken to district
police stations or the headquarters detention unit, whichever is
nearer), her finger and palm prints were taken when she arrived
downtown as is standard procedure for a homicide (people booked on
parking offenses in this jurisdiction have only a right index finger
impression taken), she was booked on the homicide charges, and she
was questioned by homicide detectives about the homicide.95 It was not
until after the homicide unit released her on February 6, 1982, that
Zola Blair was picked up again, fourteen minutes later, then
"booked" on the parking violation and an impression of her right
index finger taken. The Missouri Supreme Court concluded on this
plain record, as it affirmed the court of appeal's affirmance of the
trial court's order suppressing the evidence against Blair that 4t[t]he
record in this case supports the ruling of the trial court. The execution of the parking violation warrant was but a subterfuge or pretext
. . . to gather evidence of the unrelated crime of homicide."96
Neither the Missouri Court of Appeals nor the Missouri
94. Slate v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259. 262 (Mo. 1985), cert, granted sub nom. Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049, cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 698 (1987).
95. ld.\ State v. Blair, No. WD35622 (Mo. Ct. App. July 3. 1984).
96. 691 S.W.2d at 263.
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Supreme Court discussed the question whether this pretext was established on the record objectively or subjectively. This is not surprising. There was no reason to discuss or choose between these
approaches since, as the objective evidence was crystal clear,97 there
was no need to look at the arresting officers' subjective motivations,
which were, in any event, equally clear.98 The Missouri Supreme
Court simply cited federal and Missouri authorities for the settled
proposition that "an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search
for evidence"99 and reasoned that "[underlying these cases is appreciation for the far reaching consequences of allowing the common offense of a traffic violation to serve as a justification for an
otherwise unconstitutional search.'*100 On this basis, a four-justice
majority of the Court affirmed the trial court order sustaining Blair's
motion to suppress, holding that '[tjhe record in this case supports
the ruling of the trial court. The execution of the parking violation
warrant was but a subterfuge or pretext . . . to gather evidence of the
unrelated crime of homicide." ,()l Three Missouri Supreme Court
justices dissented. Justice Blackmar, writing for the dissenters, concluded in contrast to the majority opinion that 4t[t]he common
theme of the pretext cases is that the police arrested people without
reason. The police had a valid pre-existing warrant for Zola Blair's
97. See supra text accompanying note 94.
98. The officer who took Blair into custody testified, for example, that he went
to her home to pick her up pursuant to the "pick up" order from the homicide unit
and that he intended to detain her on that basis. Brief for Respondent at 16, Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986) (citing hearing transcript at 42-43). See also
State v. Blair, No. WD35622 (Mo. Ct. App. July 3, 1984) ("[Patrolman] Stewart
testified that he went to the residence to pick her up on the homicide pickup").
99. State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Mo. 1985) (citing United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th
Cir. 1961); State v. Goodman, 449 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1970); State v. Howell, 543
S.W.2d 836, 838 (Mo. App. 1976)), cert, granted sub nom. Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S.
1049 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 689 (1987).
100. 691 S.W.2d at 263 (citing Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308
(5th Cir. 1968)).
101. 691 S.W.2d at 263. See also State v. Blair, No. WD35622 (Mo. Ct. App. July
3, 1984) ("[I]t appears beyond peradventure that [Blair's) arrest on the parking
violation charge was but a pretext, motivated by the police officers* desire to gather
evidence, in violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the
United States Constitution.").
The Missouri Supreme Court further ruled that
[t]he palm and finger prints and statements obtained on February 5, 1982,
were properly suppressed because they resulted from an unlawful arrest
and search. Because the illegally seized evidence provided the sole basis
for the arrest warrant for homicide on February 8, 1982, and led directly
to [Blair's] statements on that day, the warrant and statement are also
inadmissible as "fruits of the poisonous tree."
691 S.W.2d at 263 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). The
state's further argument that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary
rule applied was held to be "without merit." Id.
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arrest. Any procedural irregularities which occurred afterward
should not invalidate the arrest."102
B. Argument to the Supreme Court
After certiorari was granted on the state's petition, the state's
argument to the Supreme Court on the pretext issues boiled down
to advocacy of two basic points. 103 First, the state argued that
Blair's
arrest on an outstanding, pre-existing arrest warrant for a
municipal parking violation, justified her custodial arrest
and the taking of a full set of fingerprints incident to that
arrest, and the arrest and subsequent search were not rendered 'pretextual' and therefore in violation of the Fourth
Amendment simply because the police also wished to question her about an unrelated homicide and take her fingerprints so that they could be compared to a palm print
found at the scene of the homicide.104
Second, the state argued that 4t[t]he decision of the Missouri
Supreme Court essentially holds that an objectively lawful arrest,
made pursuant to a valid warrant, can somehow be transformed into
an invalid arrest merely because of the subjective intent of the arresting officers. Such reasoning has repeatedly been rejected by this
Court." 105
The thrust of Zola Blair's response to these arguments 106 was
102. 691 S.W.2d at 267. Justice Blackmar added that
[i]nasmuch as there was basis for a lawful arrest, the order of proceedings
should make no difference. The time of booking on the traffic warrant is
an immaterial circumstance. It would be ludicrous to suggest that suppression must be ordered because the police did not retake her fingerprints after she was booked on the traffic warrant.
Id. at 266.
103. The state also argued in the alternative that even if the arrest was pretextual and, hence, unconstitutional, the suppression order was nonetheless inappropriate because: (1) the arresting officers acted in good faith, (2) the evidence would
nonetheless have been inevitably discovered, and/or Zola Blair's subsequent statements were not fruits of the illegality. Brief for Petitioner at 34, Missouri v. Blair,
474 U.S. 1049 (1986).
104. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). The state conceded that, 44[t]o be sure, the
police were more interested in determining the extent of [Zola Blair's] involvement
in the death of 59-year-old Carl Lindstedt than they were in making her answer for
the municipal parking violation." Id. at 15.
105. Id. at 12 (citations to Scott, Villamonte-Marqun, and Macon omitted). The
Scott, Villamonte-Marquez, and Macon decisions are discussed supra text accompanying
notes 10-38.
106. Blair also argued that the parking warrant arrest was in any event unlawful
under Missouri law which requires actual possession of the arrest warrant and that
no exception to the exclusionary rule appropriately applied. Brief for Respondent
at 10. 13, 18-11), 4 1-45, Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986).
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that the supposed parking violation arrest was clearly "a pretext
concealing a motive to arrest for the primary purpose of searching
for and seizing [her] inked palm impressions and interrogating her
pursuant to a homicide investigation."107 Hence, she argued, the
Missouri Supreme Court acted correctly in upholding the trial
court's suppression of the fruits of that pretextual arrest because
*[a]n arrest ostensibly for one purpose but in reality for the primary
purpose of furthering an ulterior goal is unreasonable under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." I08
C. Analysis
In light of the pretext commentaries previously discussed, 109
the pretext issues expressly or impliedly resolved in the majority
and dissenting opinions of the Missouri Supreme Court in Blair can
be parsed as follows. The Blair majority rejected (if implicitly) Professor Haddad's "hard choices'* approach to pretext analysis, using
instead what Haddad called the "case-by-case" approach that permits consideration of the existence of pretextual activity in each individual case. 110 The Blair majority did not, however, explicitly use
cither Professor LaFave's "objective" case-by-case analysis of pretexts or my "subjective" case-by-case analysis. As previously noted,
on the record in the Blair case, there was no need to be explicit
about which case—by—case approach was being used. 111 Even
under my so-called "subjective approach" to pretext analysis, a reviewing court need not assess the relevant law enforcement officer's
subjective motivation for engaging in fourth amendment activity when
107. Id. at 11.
108. Id. (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (I960); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932)). The court in Blair added:
Overlooking the primary purpose of a search or seizure would reap such
abuse, encourage such capricious searches and arrests, and engender such
disrespect and resentment of law enforcement that this Court should not
adopt such a position. Exceptions to the warrant requirement would be
used as investigative tools instead of for the purpose they were created.
Traffic offenses are easily committed, authorizing arrests in most states.
Searches of the person and automobile would follow automatically. Inventory searches of impounded vehicles would be used as investigative
tools. The plain view doctrine would no longer require discovery of evidence to be inadvertent. Administrative warrants pursuant to health, fire
and building codes could be used to further criminal investigations. Police
would generate facts ostensibly calling for the application of an exception
to the warrant requirement or for a warrant. This search or arrest power
would then be used for exploratory searches, out of caprice, or to harass
or punish,
/rf.at 11-12.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 39-85.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 62-85.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
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the objective facts clearly demonstrate—as they did here—that a pretext was present. 112 Since both the objective and subjective fact*
were clear in this case and led to the same conclusion, there was
simply no need to rest the Court's decision upon the arresting of
fleer's motivations, which were, in any event, confessedh
pretextual. 113
The dissenters on the Missouri Supreme Court in Blair took a
different approach altogether to this subject. They did not dispute
the proposition that the use of a case-by-case approach to analysis of
pretexts as constitutional or unconstitutinal was appropriate.1 u
Rather, they concluded that this case simply was not a pretext case
because "[tjhe common theme of the pretext cases is that the police
arrested people without a reason,"115 and that, in this case, "[t]he
police had a valid pre-existing [parking] warrant for Zola Blair's
arrest."1 H> In short, there was no pretext here, in the dissenters'
view, because the parking violation "was [a] basis for a lawful
arrest." ,l7
This supposed "objective" approach utilized by the Blair dissenters should not be confused with Professor LaFave's "objective"
approach to pretext analysis. They are totally different. Under Professor LaFave's approach, the "objective" question to be asked in
assessing whether a cognizable, unconstitutional pretext exists is
whether this supposed parking arrest was "carried out in accordance
with standard procedures in the local police department."118 This
question is, of course, easy to answer and easily establishes a pretext
on the Blair facts since the pick-up/arrest clearly deviated from standard procedures for traffic or parking offenses.119 But that fact of
arbitrary deviation from standard procedures was irrelevant to the
Blair dissenters. Rather, their point was that since it was possible to
make a legitimate parking arrest in the Blair circumstances,120 it
does not matter for constitutional purposes that this parking arrest
was not in fact a normal parking arrest or undertaken for that pur112. See supra noies 43-45 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
114. State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259, 266-67 (Mo. 1985), cert, granted sub nom.
Missouri v. Blair. 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 689 (1987). The
dissent cites a number of pretext cases in an approving fashion, but distinguishes
them on the grounds discussed in the text which follows.
115. Id. at 267.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 266.
118. See supra text accompanying note 50.
119. See supra text accompanying note 95.
120. This point is, parenthetically, not as self-evident as the Blair dissenters
thought. Under Missouri law in effect at the time of the pick up/arrest, a warrant
issued on the basis of a nonappearance to answer a parking violation ticket needed
to be in the possession of the arresting officer in order to be validly executed. Mo.
RF.V. STAT. § 544.180 (1978); Rustici v. Weidemeyer. 673 S.W.2d 762 (Mo. 1984).
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pose. In short, the Blair dissenters argued that since probable cause
to arrest Zola Blair for her criminal parking existed, it does not matter how (LaFave's analysis) or why (my analysis) she was in fact arrested for such a violation.
I think this is a very dangerous position to take121 and I have
elsewhere criticized this result-oriented view of pretext law by noting that
It is one thing to conclude, as both LaFave and this
author do, that a police officers improper rationale for a
search is rendered constitutionally irrelevant when a
proper and independently sufficient rationale is also present at the time of the search; it is another thing entirely to
argue that an improper rationale that was the sole basis for
a search is irrelevant when, absent that rationale, the police
<4
would have" engaged in the same search with a proper
rationale. This hypothetical "proper rationale" bears no
more relation to the search that was actually conducted
than does the probable cause that unbeknowst to the
searching officer "objectively" exists elsewhere in the universe. Like those "objective" facts, a hypothesized "proper
rationale" for a search is irrelevant to its constitutionality.
The search must be evaluated on the basis of the facts upon which the
officer actually acted, not those that an imaginative prosecutor might
argue the officer would have acted upon under some other hypothetical circumstance.122
If the Blair dissenters' narrow view of pretext were to prevail,
anyone who has an outstanding parking or traffic "warrant" could
be arrested at any time because the police wanted to investigate any
other offense. The fourth amendment's requirement of probable
cause would, in essence, be nullified as to that individual with respect to virtually any searches or seizures the police wanted to make.
And, considering the probable number of individuals with outstanding traffic or parking tickets that exist in this country, it is highly
likely that literally millions of Americans would fall into this cate121. The Blair dissenters are not the only judges to take this flawed position. See
also, e.g., Judge Gee's majority opinion in United Slates v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179,
1185 n . l l (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), finding nothing wrong with the arrest of a
defendant. Causey, on a seven and one-half year old bench warrant for a misdemeanor theft charge in order to question him about a bank robbery for which there
was no probable cause: "Causey had, long before the police apprehended him,
foreited his right to be free from arrest. He was already the object of an arrest
warrant; he had been subject to arrest at all times since its issuance; and he can
scarcely complain that the police finally got around to executing a valid warrant."
Id.
122. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 105 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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gory. 123 Judge Rubin of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has eloquently made this same point in dissent in a case decided
subsequent to the Supreme Court's short-lived consideration of
Blair:
In the kind of society in which we live, few persons
have a life so blameless that some reason to arrest them
cannot be found, whether it be for entering an intersection
when the light is on caution, or for violating a zoning regulation, or for having an expired brake tag. The fourth
amendment protection against arrests without probable
cause is designed to protect citizens against being arrested
for such a matter when there is no objective justification for
the arrest save the police's desire to question the person in
custody about a matter for which they lack the authority to
make an arrest.
123. See, e.g.. United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1189-90 (5th Cir. 1987)
(Rubin, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted):
News reports indicate how many millions will be exposed to pretextual
arrest . . . either because a warrant to arrest them for some offense has
already been issued or because they have been charged with an offense for
which a warrant might be obtained. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
has been testing a system that permits inquiries about criminal suspects
from every state to be compared with names registered in a computer.
"The primary purpose of the project is to devise a national communications system through which a policeman in New York, a prosecutor in Chicago or a judge in Los Angeles will be able to determine swiftly whether
the suspects they are holding have ever been arrested in any other state."
Five years ago policemen were routinely using the system more than
300,000 times a day to answer such questions as whether a car is stolen.
Syracuse, New York, has 20,000 delinquent parking tickets. In Toledo, Ohio, 31,890 parking tickets were reported delinquent, and, after
intensified police efforts, only slightly more than half were paid. In Indianapolis, Indiana, "Itjhe computer told polite they could find 5,800 defendants at 2,700 companies. It also showed there were 28,000
outstanding warrants for traffic offenses, 9,000 for misdemeanors and
1,500 for felonies." Indianapolis police reported an estimated 27,000
such lawbreakers.
Washington, D.C. has records of 500,000 residents of Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia who have failed to pay parking tickets.
Los Angeles has considered an amnesty program in which 810,000 traffic
offenses carried on the court's computer docket might be settled by payment "while having arrest warrants dismissed."
These are but examples. Current technology has made it possible for
every police system in the nation to record in a computer the name of
every traffic offender and every other person wanted for any offense, however trivial, and for a national system to collate all of these records.
Id.
It should not be difficult to convince the Supreme Court to take judicial notice
of the fact that even ordinarily law-abiding citizens occasionally receive such tickets.
Cf Rehnquist Is Given Ticket for Speeding, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1986, at 10, col. 1.
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Untold thousands of Americans are subject to arrest
for failing to pay parking tickets, failure to respond to summonses for traffic violations, and similar minor offenses
. . . . Police who desire to arrest an individual without
probable cause may merely leaf through the files or turn to
the computer to determine whether they can find some reasons to arrest a suspect for whose arrest they otherwise lack
probable cause, just as the police did when they set out to
find some pretext to arrest [the defendant in this case].
While I do not condone the possible law violations that led
to the imposition of the earlier charges, I do not think such
prior derelictions strip the alleged lawbreakers of fourth
amendment protection if they should later be suspected of
other offenses.124
Are such claims of the erosion of constitutional protections hyperbolic or exaggerated? Well, the Missouri Supreme Court's Blair
decision, accepted on certiorari, gave the United States Supreme
Court the opportunity to answer this question as well as to answer
or reaffirm the answer to two of the most important and controversial doctrinal questions relating to pretexts, namely:
(1) Was the Blair Court correct in applying a case-by-case
pretext analysis? Or, put another way, was the Blair Court
correct in assuming that suppression of evidence seized as
a result of pretextual fourth amendment activity was compelled or otherwise appropriate?
(2) Was the Blair Court majority correct in ruling that
when the record evidence established that an arrest was
made in bad faith, i.e., as a pretextual means to arrest and
acquire evidence about a crime where there was no probable cause, the arrest was ipso facto unconstitutional? Or, in
contrast, were the Blair Court dissenters correct in arguing
that where the record established that a lawful parking
arrest could be made, it does not matter how or why such an
arrest was actually made?
124. Causey, 834 F.2d at 1189 (Rubin, J., dissenting). In Causey, the Fifth Circuit,
sitting en banc, on an 8 to 6 vote, reversed a prior panel decision at 818 F.2d 354
(5th Cir. 1987), which had found the pretext arrest at issue in that case to be unconstitutional. The reach of the Causey majority opinion is limited, however, by the
comments of one of the judges in the majority (whose vote was necessary to make
up the bare majority) who specifically noted that
there is a risk that with the storage and retrieval capability of today's computers, warrants may function in a manner similar to the old general writs
of assistance. . . . Our conclusion today . . . does not tolerate such a storing of warrants. We decide no issues attending a system of obtaining warrants and "warehousing'* them for a purpose other than to arrest for the
offense for which probable cause is found.
834 F.2d at 1186 (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring) (footnote omitted).
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While these two specific issues set out above were clearly before
the Supreme Court arising out of the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Blair, the briefs of the parties to the Court, as is perhaps to
be expected, muddied the waters just a bit. The state contended
that Zola Blair's arrest was not pretextual "simply because the police also wished to question her about an unrelated homicide and
take her fingerprints.*"25 The state also argued that the Blair majority decision "essentially holds that an objectively lawful arrest, made
pursuant to a valid warrant, can somehow be transformed into an
invalid arrest merely because of the subjective intent of the arresting
officers/*126
Both of these arguments misstate the record and the Missouri
Supreme Court's holding in Blair. The Blair Court did not find, as
the state suggested, that the record facts presented a situation involving "mixed motives," i.e., that the police were acting for a mix of
proper and improper reasons. 127 I have argued that in such mixed
motives cases, there is a cognizable unconstitutional pretext only if,
borrowing former Justice Powell's formula from Michigan v. Clifford,l2H the improper motive is "the primary object of the search.",29
Professor Haddad has responded that if a motive-oriented test was
used by the Court, it should require evidentiary suppression in a
broader category of cases, namely where "the improper motivation
played a significant role in the officers' decisional process/" 30 But
neither Haddad's nor my approach would have been dispositive in
Blair because the Missouri Supreme Court ruled (as had the lower
courts) that the reasons for Zola Blair's arrest were entirely improper:
"[T]he arrest, in the circumstances of this case, was at best a pretext
employed to gather evidence on an unrelated homicide . . . .",31
Accordingly, the state misstated the record in arguing to the United
States Supreme Court that the Blair case involved the issue of
whether a lawful arrest was rendered pretextual simply because the
!25. See supra text accompanying note !04.
126. See supta text accompanying note 105.
127. See discussion of mixed motives in BurkofT, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2,
at 103-04; Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 17, at 534; Haddad, supra note
16, at 649. 674 n.158. 683-85; Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 698 n.16; Note,
supra note 23, at 257-63.
128. 464 U.S. 287 (1984).
129. Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 697-98, 698 n.16.
130. Haddad, supra note 16, at 684 (emphasis original) (citing Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motivation, 1971
SUP. CT. REV. 95, 130-31).
131. State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Mo. 1985). cert, granted sub nom. Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 689 (1987). The court
added that "(tjhe record in this case supports the ruling of the trial court [that t]he
execution of the parking violation warrant was but a subterfuge or pretext . . . to
gather evidence of the unrelated crime of homicide." Id. at 263.
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police questioned the arrestee about other crimes. 132 That is an interesting question, but, it was not before the Supreme Court in
Blair,
The second pretext issue raised by the State of Missouri in its
brief to the Supreme Court in Blair, that the Missouri Supreme
Court had used a subjective pretext analysis, was also a misstatement of the Missouri Supreme Court's holding. As previously discussed, the issue of the significance of the subjective motivations of
the arresting law enforcement officers in Blair was simply not part of
the Blair Court's decision, nor was it necessary to the decision. 133
The pretext arguments raised by Zola Blair before the Supreme
Court simply and understandably {i.e., she won below) followed the
lead of the Missouri Supreme Court majority urging that a finding
of pretext was clearly established on the record. 134 In addition,
Blair went a step further. She asked the Court in her brief to acknowledge the fact that the subjective intent of law enforcement officers is—and has been—a relevant consideration in assessing the
existence of pretext,135 warning that t4[i]f [the] subjective intent of
the police is made totally irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis,
such activity will never be deterred as it will never come to the attention of the courts." 136
As I have noted, this issue of the significance of the subjective
intention of the arresting officers was not directly before the
Supreme Court in Blair.™1 Nonetheless, given the posture of the
case as argued to the Court, it was conceivable that the Court might
also express its views on a third question, not included within the
132. The state was wildly excessive in its argument on this point, contending
chat the "effect (of the Missouri Supreme Court's Blair decision] would be to immunize from arrest those parking violators who are suspected of serious crimes, while
allowing the arrest of all other nonsuspicious violators." Brief for Petitioner at 3233. Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986). The state added: "This is foolishness." Id. at 33. The state was, at least, correct on that score. It would, of course,
not have been a pretext if Zola Blair had been lawfully arrested for murder,
whatever her status as a parking violator.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98, 111-13. The state once again
taxed hyperbolic on this non-issue, warning the Court that "[i]f the decision of the
Missouri Supreme Court is allowed to stand, it would be the first case where an
otherwise lawful arrest, made pursuant to a valid, pre-existing arrest warrant, was
held unlawful simply because of the subjective intent of the arresting officers."
Brief for Petitioner at 32, Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986) (footnote omitted). Not only is this an untrue and inaccurate statement of the Missouri Supreme
Court's majority opinion, it is also not true that if this case did rely solely on the
subjective intent of the arresting officers, it would be an unprecedented case.
There are hundreds of such cases (and rightfully so). See, e.g., decisions cited supra
note 56.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 96 and 101.
135. Brief for Respondent at 22-41, Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986).
136. Id. at 39.
137. See supra text accompanying note 133.
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quist, held that the discovery of the narcotics was constitutional despite the absence of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) to
search anywhere: the van, the backpack, the nylon bag, or the metal
canisters. Rehnquist cited in support of the conclusion that probable cause was unnecessary the following language from South Dakota v. Oppennan: "The standard of probable cause is peculiarly
related to criminal investigations, not routine, noncriminal proceAs previously discussed, none of these three questions—or any
dures. . . . The probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis
other issue relating to fourth amendment pretexts—was discussed
centers upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretakor resolved by the United States Supreme Court in Blair because the
mg functions, particularly when no claim is made that the protective proceCourt simply and inexplicably dismissed the writ of certiorari as imdures are a subterfuge for criminal investigations.11145
139
providently granted.
Nonetheless, the justices must have clearly
As previously noted, 140 South Dakota v. Opperman is a paradigconsidered, analyzed, and debated these pretext issues and argumatic case reaffirming the constitutional validity of what Professor
ments since they later expressed their collective views on these matHaddad had critically termed 4icase-by-case" pretext analysis. In
ters in the very same term that the Blair case was argued and
Oppennan, the Supreme Court held that inventory searches of
dismissed. These views were propounded in four decisions handed
automobiles are an exception to the fourth amendment warrant and
140
down after the oral argument in Blair: Colorado i/. Bertine, Mary- probable cause requirements and, accordingly, may only be made for
land v. Garrison,141 O'Connor v. Ortega?4* and New York v. Burger}41 If routine administrative caretaking purposes. As a result, the Opperthere was any question (as there obviously was in some minds)
man Court ruled that law enforcement officers cannot make such
whether a viable pretext doctrine existed after the Supreme Court's
suspicionless searches pretextually for the actual purpose of crimiunfortunate obiter dicta in Scott and unfortunate footnote in Vil- nal investigation. The Bertine Court's approving quotation of the
lamonte-Marquez, these four decisions resolved that question, making language in Opperman making this point is, in and of itself, an imit clear that the doctrine is very much alive and well.
plicit reaffirmation of the appropriateness of this type of case-bycase approach to pretext analysis. But the Bertine Court went farther
IV.
THE "RETURN" OF PRETEXT LAW: BERTINE, GARRISON,
still and made this implicit point explicit.
ORTEGA, AND BURGER
*
After finding that the inventory search of Bertine's van and its
contents was constitutional even in the absence of probable cause
due to the special status of such routine administrative searches, the
A. Colorado v. Bertine
Court
made clear that this exceptional administrative search rule apIn Colorado v. Bertine,144 the Supreme Court ruled that the suspiplied, however, in the Bertine case only because there was no evicionless inventory search of the contents of a van belonging to an
dence of pretext on the record. In Chief Justice Rehnquist's words,
arrestee, Steven Bertine, was constitutional. Bertine had already
"In the present case, as in Opperman and Lafayette147, there was no
been taken into custody for driving while under the influence of alshowing that the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted in
cohol when the van was searched. The van was towed to an imbad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation."14*
poundment lot only after the inventory search took place.
This is a critical point for understanding the Court's view of
During the inventory search, the searching officer discovered
how the pretext search doctrine applies. The Supreme Court's rulnarcotics contained in metal' canisters in a nylon bag in a closed
ing in Bertine that suspicionless inventory searches of the contents of
backpack that was found directly behind the front seat of the van.
vehicles are constitutional was explicitly conditioned upon the findThe Supreme Court majority, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehning that there was no evidence that the police officers were not maktwo issues set out previously arising out of the Missouri Supreme
Court's decision.
That third question is:
(3) Is the subjective motivation of the searching or arresting officers—their bad faith (or lack thereof)—properly
considered in assessing whether or not there is a cognizable pretext?

138. The oral argument in Blair before ihe Supreme Court reflected various justices' keen intciest in this third issue.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
140. 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
141. 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
142. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
143. 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987).
144. 479 U.S. 367 (1987).

145. Id. at 371 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364. 370 n.5
(1976)).
146. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
147. The reference is to Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), a case that
held constitutional the suspicionless inventory search of personal effects in a shoulder bag carried by an arrestee at a police station.
148. 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (emphasis added).
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ing precisely what the search purported to be, namely an inventory
Bertine majority stressed, this particular inventory search was consti(not an investigative) search. Following the Bertine Court's lantutional as an inventory search not only because there was no showguage, a defendant could demonstrate that a search was not in fact
ing of the failure to follow "standardized procedures," but also
an inventory, i.e., that it was pretextual, by making a showing that
because "there was no showing that the police . . . acted in bad faith or
the police failed to follow "standardized procedures" or "acted in
for the sole purpose of investigation."15** Despite Chief Justice Rehnbad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation." 149
quist's curious disjunctive reference to a showing either of "bad
faith" or an improper "sole purpose" on the part of the searching
This language from Bertine is, of course, a striking reaffirmation
officers, the import of this language is clear, namely that a subjective
of the so-called case-by-case approach to pretext analysis. If Bertine
had been able to make this showing of pretext in his case, the search
approach to pretext analysis is not merely legitimate, it is an essenwould have been declared unconstitutional because it was not in fact
tial part of fourth amendment doctrine in this area. The Bertine mawhat it purported to be. Moreover, the Bertine Court's exposition of
jority reiterated this point later in its opinion when it held that "[w]e
this point is also an express endorsement of the sort of "objective"
conclude that here, as in Lafayette, reasonable police regulations reanalysis of pretext urged by Professor LaFave 150 coupled with the
lating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the
sort of "subjective" analysis I have urged.' 5 1
Fourth Amendment." 1 5 7
LaFave's "objective" approach is followed in Bertine by the
It is important to stress that the objective and subjective pretext
Court's requirement that for the inventory search to be constitucriteria are also repeatedly used by the Bertine Court in the disjunctional, the searching officers must have followed "standardized protive. This is an important point because it means that a showing of
cedures." Reference to this phrase was not inadvertent. The Bertine either type of proof of pretext satisfies the test set out in Bertine and
Court strongly reiterated this requirement later in its opinion, again
serves to make such a search unconstitutional. Hence, even where
citing Opperman and Lafayette, and declared, "We emphasize that, in
the police procedures are themselves objectively reasonable, a
this case, the trial court found that the police department's proceshowing of the absence of good faith, i.e., bad faith or subjective
dures mandated the opening of closed containers and the listing of
pretextual motivation, is sufficient in se to establish unconstitutional
their contents. Our decisions have always adhered to the requirement ihai activity. The Bertine Court made the disjunctive appiicaiion of its
152
inventories be conducted according to standardized criteria.'*
pretext test patent when it summed up its pretext analysis as applied
Indeed, it is worth noting that the "standardized procedures"
to the particular facts of Bertine in the penultimate paragraph of the
requirement was set out not only in the Rehnquist majority opinion
opinion as follows:
but was emphatically endorsed by all nine of the justices in Bertine.
Nothing in Opperman or Lafayette prohibits the exercise of
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Powell and O'Connor, wrote a
police
discretion so long as that discretion is exercised acbrief, separate concurring opinion in Bertine specifically for the purcording to standard criteria [the objective test] and on the
pose of "underscoring] the importance of having such inventories
basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of
conducted only pursuant to standardized police procedures." 153
criminal activity [the subjective test]. Here, the discretion
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented in Bertine, but
afforded the Boulder police was exercised in light of stanacknowledged nonetheless that "[standardized procedures are necdardized criteria, related to the feasibility and appropriateessary to ensure that this narrow exception is not improperly used
154
ness of parking and locking a vehicle rather than
to justify, after the fact, a warrantless investigative foray."
impounding it. [Hence, no objective evidence of pretext.]
The Bertine Court, as previously noted, did not simply reaffirm
There was no showing that the police chose to impound
an objective approach to pretext analysis; rather, it also expressly
Bertine's van in order to investigate suspected criminal acendorsed the use of the sort of "subjective," "bad-faith," "case-by155
case" analysis of pretexts that I have long been urging.
As the
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
See supia text accompanying notes 46-61.
Set supra text accompanying notes 39-45.
Beitine, 479 U.S. at 374 n.6 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
Id. at 376 (Blackmun. J., concurring).
Id. at 381 (M.tishall. J.. dissenting).
See sitpia text accompanying notes 39-45.

156. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372 (emphasis added). While I urged at one time adoption of a bad-faith pretext test like the "sole purpose" language used in the disjuncti\e in this quotation from Bertine, see Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 10304. I have moderated in my dotage and favor the more workable "primary object"
\*\i first announced by former Justice Powell in Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287,
294 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes 128-29; Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note
9. at 698 n.16.
157. 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1979) (emphasis added).
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i trine, the Bertine decision should have settled the issue once and
for all.
As previously discussed, there is absolutely no tension between
the Bertine Court's acceptance o{both an objective and subjective pre'
text analysis. 159 Indeed, this is the appropriate way to analyze pre- B. Maryland v. Garrison
texts. The subjective test is best considered a supplementary one ]
One month after the Supreme Court decided Bertine, it handed
useful to illuminate the meaning of otherwise neutral-appearing down another fourth amendment decision, Maryland v. Garrison.165
(objective) police conduct. Where law enforcement search and The Garrison Court shed additional light on the question whether a
seizure activity is patently objectively unconstitutional, there is sim- law enforcement officer's subjective intent to engage in unconstituply no need to turn to a subjective analysis of the searching officers tional activity could render otherwise objectively neutral activity unmotivations for undertaking the search.160 Where, on the other constitutional. Consistent with the analysis and holding in the
hand, the objective evidence is facially neutral, i.e., it neither sup Bertine decision, the Garrison Court answered this question in the
ports nor precludes unconstitutional motivation, a defendant hasj affirmative.
the opportunity to establish—where he or she can—the existence of
In Garrison, a majority of the Supreme Court held constitutional
an unconstitutional motivation in that case, the intent in fact to! a search by Baltimore police officers of the wrong apartment pursumake an investigatory search.
j ant to a search warrant. The warrant authorized a search for mariIn sum, the Bertine Court reaffirmed that a defendant may estab-!juana of the person of Lawrence McWebb and "the premises known
lish that a purported inventory search was unconstitutional whercl as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment."164 In fact, unbethe searching officers: (1) did not possess probable cause, and! knownst to the police, the third floor of the residence located at
(2) the defendant can establish either (a) that the officers failed to 2036 Park Avenue was divided into two apartments, one occupied
follow "standardized procedures" in their inventory activity, or by McWebb and the other by defendant, Harold Garrison, who was
(b) that there was "bad faith" on the part of the searching officers or neither a target of the search nor otherwise under suspicion. The
that the search was undertaken "for the sole purpose of investiga- executing officers went into Garrison's apartment by mistake and,
tion." 161 If there was ever truly any question whether the Supreme before they became aware of their error, they discovered heroin. 165
Court accepts case-by-case application of the pretext search doc Garrison claimed that since the police did not have a warrant to
enter his apartment, the heroin was seized as a result of an unconsti158. Id. at 375-76 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
j tutional search and should, accordingly, be suppressed. The
159. See supra discussion at text accompanying notes 43-45, note 45, and tei Supreme Court disagreed.
accompanying note 52.
Justice Stevens, writing for a six-justice majority of the Court in
160. This is what happened in the Missouri Supreme Court's opinion in Mis-I Garrison, held the search and seizure constitutional because,
souri v. Blair. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98 and 111-13. Moreover, all
lowing for some differences in terminology, this is assumably the same point madq although mistaken about whose premises they were searching, the
in dissent in Bertine by Justice Marshall when he offered his own explanation of thj executing officers "perceived McWebb's apartment and the thirdmajority result as follows:
j floor premises as one and the same; therefore their execution of the
Standardized procedures are necessary to ensure that this narrow [invenwarrant reasonably included the entire third floor . . . [since] the
tory search I exception is not improperly used to justify, after the fact, a
officers' conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain
warrantless investigative foray. Accordingly, to invalidate a search that is
and identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning
conducted without established procedures, it is not necessary to establish
of the Fourth Amendment/* 166
that the police actually acted in bad faith, or that the inventory was in fact a

tivity. [Hence, no subjective evidence of pretext.] 158

"pretext."
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 381 (emphasis added).
Other than the fact that Justice Marshall implicitly equates use of the tern
"pretext" only with a subjective analysis, this explanation fully comports with th<
majority holding. Where an objective showing of pretext is made, it is totally un
necessary to also make a subjective, bad-faith showing of pretext in order to estab
lish the unconstitutionality of the police conduct. Nonetheless, as the Supremi
Court majority in Bertine repeatedly staled, a showing that bad faith existed (u.
that the search was actually investigatory) is sufficient in and of itself to render sud
a purported inventory search pretextual and, hence, unconstitutional.
161. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372.

162. As previously discussed, Professor Haddad has argued that the Supreme
Court has never accepted such an approach. See supra text accompany notes 63-64
and 84.
163. 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
164. Id. at 80. There was no question that the warrant to search McWebb and
his premises was valid and supported by probable cause. Id.
165. As the officers entered the third floor vestibule, they could see the interior
of McWebb's apartment to their left and Garrison's to the right as the doors to both
apartments were open. Id.
166. Id. at 88-89 (footnotes omitted).
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Blair169). If the executing officers searched Garrison's premises on
this pretextual basis, the question then arises: would such a search
be unconstitutional?170
The answer, of course, is "yes." Before explaining why, let me
respond to the nay-sayers first. Professor Haddad would apparently
argue that the answer to this question is and should be "no," that
the law enforcement officers' unlawful subjective intentions are totally irrelevant to fourth amendment analysis, that the Supreme
Court has not paid any attention to such subjective considerations,
that, in any event, no attention should be paid to such pretextual activity in any individual case. Rather, Haddad contends, the Supreme
Court might consider changing its rule on mistaken searches pursuant to search warrants in order to generally deter such pretextual
activity.171
In essence, the rule that the Garrison Court adopted to govern
The most obvious problem with this approach—aside from the
when mistaken searches of premises pursuant to a valid warrant arc
fact that, as I have previously discussed, 172 it does not reflect what
constitutional is a reasonable good-faith test. The Court upheld the
the Supreme Court has actually said in the past nor what the law
constitutionality of this search and seizure due to the confluence of
should be—is that in application, it ignores pretextual activity altothe proper subjective criteria, i.e., the executing officers believed in
gether thus endangering the efficacy of fourth amendment law. Pregood-faith that they were in the right place, and objective criteria, U, texts are cases where, whatever the fourth amendment rule is, it is
that belief was reasonable. As Justice Stevens explained, "[This]
not followed (except in a fictive sense). To effectively deter pretexts
Court has . . . recognized the need to allow some latitude for honest only with general rules, the Supreme Court would have to continumistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult proously change every fourth amendment rule every time it saw a way
cess of making arrests and executing search warrants/'168
for law enforcement officers to circumvent the rule while engaging
in facially neutral activity. But this is impossible; law enforcement
But we are not interested in this Article ip honest mistakes; we
officers can always pretend to follow the law while not actually doing
are interested in pretexts, searches or seizures undertaken for reaso. Professor Haddad concedes as much. 173 As a result, changes in
sons that do not constitute a proper legal justification for such activfourth amendment general rules can do little or nothing to effecity. To analyze the relationship between the pretext issue and the
tively deter actual pretexts. In any event, the Supreme Court has
law relating to the constitutionality of an honest mistake, consider a
rule in Gairison, as it has in numerous other
new case, arising after the Garrison decision, that poses the Garrison already crafted a general
174
cases,
like
Opperman,
to
take account of pretexts by recognizing
case facts with everything unchanged except one critical fact: the
the necessity for dealing with them on a case-by-case basis and, as
executing officers know full well that they are in the wrong place,
will be discussed, by permitting the use of a subjective analysis to
namely Garrison's apartment. Perhaps it is belaboring the obvious
boot.
to point out that there are any number of explanations for why poJustice Blackmar of the Missouri Supreme Court and the other
lice officers might want to search Garrison's apartment even though
dissenting justices in Missouri v. Blair175 would also be constrained
they know it is his and that they have a warrant only for McWebb's
on the basis of the theory propounded in their Blair dissent to uppremises. Perhaps the executing officers don't like the way Garrison
looks or acts or the color of his skin, perhaps they wonder about him
169. See supra text accompanying notes 87-102.
because he has a previous arrest record or because he lives in the
170. A search made on this basis would be pretextual by definition. See supra
wrong part of town, the wrong building, or next to the wrong neightext at note 2.
bor, or perhaps they simply "suspect" that he might be involved in
171. See supra text accompanying notes 62-72.
other crimes but they have no—or not enough—evidence to lawfully
172. See supra text accompanying notes 73-85.
173. Professor Haddad throws up his hands and says: "So be it." See supra note
arrest or search him on that basis (remember the facts in Missouri v.
The reasonableness of the executing officers' mistake about the
apartment they were in was, however, critical to this holding. The
officers* belief that they were in McWebb's apartment was a reason
able one, the Court concluded, given the physical configuration a
the 2036 Park Avenue third floor. As Justice Stevens reasoned:
[T]he validity of the search of [Garrison's] apartment pursuant to a warrant authorizing the search of the entire third
floor depends on whether the officers' failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable. Here it unquestionably was. The objective facts
available to the officers at the time suggested no distinction
between McWebb's apartment and the third-floor
premises. Mi7

167.
168.

Id. (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
Id. at 87 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).

66 and accompanying text.
174. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), discussed supra note 76
and accompanying text and text accompanying note 146.
175. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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hold the constitutionality of the actions of my pretextual executing ion, if Garrison had shown—as he did not—that the executing ofofficers in my Garrison -based hypothetical. As the dissenters argued ficers in fact did not make an honest mistake, if he had shown
in Blair, even if the officers are in fact acting without constitutional instead that they knew that they were in the wrong apartment, the
justification, they could have acted constitutionally, i.e., in this exam- search would have been unconstitutional. It would have been unple, if they had not known that they were in the wrong place, their constitutional because it was a pretext since the officers did not have
action would have been objectively constitutional under the rule in the lawful constitutional authority to search Garrison's apartment
Garrison; hence, there is no pretext. This approach leads to the same and the search was undertaken instead for reasons that did not condysfunctional and dangerous results as Professor Haddad's ap- stitute a proper justification for such activity. It would have been
proach. As I have criticized earlier,176 this result-oriented analysis, unconstitutional despite the fact that the search looked objectively
by failing to pay any attention to what has actually occurred, as op- constitutional, i.e.y if we didn't know better, this looked like these
posed to the fictive possibilities, totally fails to deter any police mis- officers honestly thought they were searching McWebb's apartment,
conduct where the searching officers had the perspicacity to make and it would have been unconstitutional despite the fact that a lawtheir actions look good, even though they clearly were not. Indeed, ful search of Garrison's apartment could have been made, i.e., if the
using Justice Blackmar's or Professor Haddad's analyses, the search officers had honestly and reasonably believed they were searching
would be declared constitutional even if the misbehaving officers re- McWebb's apartment. The fact that a lawful search could have been
peatedly confessed their unconstitutional misbehavior under oath, made does not mean that when the police do not in fact make such a
e
'g-> "We searched Garrison's apartment only because he is black," lawful search, we can ignore the pretext and pretend that the search
since a suppression court would be constrained to ignore the sub- is constitutional.
jective motivations of the searching officers altogether.
C. O'Connor v. Ortega
But, fortunately, the Supreme Court neither endorsed nor utilized the Blackmar or Haddad approaches. What did the Supreme
Just a few weeks after the Supreme Court's decision in Garrison,
Court actually say in Garrison relevant to this pretext issue? To re- the Court decided another case that directly touched upon fourth
w
peat my question: would a search of Garrison's apartment be unamendment pretext issues, O'Connor v. Ortega.170 A five-justice maconstitutional if all the facts were the same as in the actual case
jority of the Court (composed of a four-justice plurality and one
except that the executing officers knew that they were in the wrong
concurring justice) ruled that some searches of the offices of public
place?
*
employees undertaken without probable cause by their employers
The Supreme Court made it crystal clear in Garrison that such a are constitutional.180 Justice O'Connor, in her plurality opinion for
pretextual search would be unconstitutional. As the Court noted
four members of the Court, concluded that "public employer intruwith respect to the warrant application and issuance, "Plainly, if the sions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of governofficers had known, or even if they should have known, that there were two ment employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as
separate dwelling units on the third floor of 2036 Park Avenue, they
well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be
would have been obligated to exclude [Garrison's] apartment from
judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circum177
the scope of the requested warrant."
Moreover, with respect to
stances."181 Justice Scalia, who provided the fifth vote upholding
the warrant's execution, the Court made exactly the same point: "If the constitutionality of the search of public employees' offices withthe officers had known, or should have known) that the third floor con- out probable cause, disagreed "with the plurality's view that the reatained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on the
sonableness of the expectation of privacy (and thus the existence of
third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they
Fourth Amendment protection) changes 'when an intrusion is by a
would have been obligated to limit their search to McWebb's
supervisor rather than a law enforcement official.' " I 8 2 Nonetheless,
178
apartment.'*
Justice Scalia concluded that warrantless "government searches [of
In short, as the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized in Garri176. See supra text accompanying notes 114-24.
177. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987) (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 87 (emphasis added). The Court added: "Moreover, as the officers
recognized, they were required to discontinue the search of [Garrison's] apartment
as soon as thev discovered that there were two separate units on the third floor
" Id.

179. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
180. The Ortega decision concerned the fourth amendment but was not a fourth
amendment case. Rather, it was a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982) on the basis of an alleged violation of an individual's fourth amendment
rights.
181. 480 U.S. at 725-26 (O'Connor, J.).
182. Id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting the plurality opinion).
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public employees' offices] to retrieve work-related materials or to
investigate violations of workplace rules" are constitutional within
the dictates of the fourth amendment. 183
The issue of pretext arose in Ortega because it was not clear
from the record why the particular public employee office search at
issue in that case was carried out. Since the four-justice plurality
concluded that only public employee searches undertaken by an employer "for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes . . . [or] for investigations of work-related misconduct"184 were constitutional
when undertaken on less than probable cause, the Court remanded 185 the case in order for the trial court to determine "iht
actual justification for the search."1™
The existence of a pretext issue in Ortega should be clear from
the Supreme Court's finding of the necessity for a remand to resolve
the factual question of the searching agents* justification for their
search. Dr. Ortega, whose office was searched, based much of his
argument on a pretext claim.187 He contended, in the plurality's
words, "that the intrusion was an investigatory search whose purpose was simply to discover evidence that would be of use in administrative proceedings." 1 ? 8 The plurality ordered a remand so that
the trial court could, inter alia, "determine the justification for the
search and seizure." 189 This is classic pretext search doctrine. If
the search of Dr. Ortega's office was in fact undertaken for workrelated reasons, it was constitutional; if, instead, it was in fact undertaken for investigatory reasons, it was unconstitutional (despite its
otherwise objectively neutral appearance).
«
Justice Scalia, whose Fifth vote was necessary to form a majority,
also turned the question of the constitutionality of this search under
the fourth amendment on the lower court's resolution on remand of
the question whether the search of Dr. Ortega's office was in fact "to
retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules.",<M) To Justice Scalia, such a motivation on the part of
the searching agents would be, in his words, "a validating purpose. " , y l The absence of such a proper purpose, in contrast, dic183.

Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring).

184.

Id. at 725 ( O ' C o n n o r , J ) .

185. The Ortega decision resulted in a remand of the civil rights action because
that was the relief ordered by both the plurality and Justice Scalia in his separate
opinion and, hence, was the relief agreed to by a majority of the Court.
186. OConner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 729 (1987) (emphasis added).
187. See Brief for Respondent In Propria Persona at 45-47, OConner v. Orteira
480 U.S. 709 (1987); Brief of Amicus Curiae Joel Klein at 30-31, O'ConnerV
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
188. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 725-26.
189. Id. at 729.
190. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring).
8
! 9 i . Id.
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lated a finding of unconstitutionality. It is hard to imagine a firmer
endorsement from either the Ortega plurality or from Justice Scalia
of the propositions that case-by-case analysis of pretexts is appropriate and that the subjective motivation of the searching agents is important to fourth amendment pretext analysis, i.e., whether a lawful
"validating purpose" existed for the search.
Furthermore, there were four dissenting justices in Ortega and
their dissenting analysis did no violence to—indeed it underscored—the majority's pretext doctrinal analysis. Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, dissented because he concluded that there was no "special need" to search public employees' offices sufficient to justify a per se exception to the
normal fourth amendment requirements of a warrant and probable
cause.192 Although this conclusion was dispositive for the dissenters, Justice Blackmun also took issue with the plurality's analysis of
the record facts. After reviewing the evidence in the record, primarily deposition testimony about how the search was conducted, when
it was conducted, and why it was conducted. Justice Blackmun concluded that the search was indeed "plainly exceptional and investigatory in nature."193 Accordingly, he castigated the plurality for
permitting the potential application of "inventory search" rules to
an investigative search case. In other words, Justice Blackmun's dissent evaluated the objective and subjective evidence on the record
as establishing that—whatever the searching agents or their lawyers
claimed—this search was not actually an inventory search. The fact
that it was not an inventory search means that it was not entitled to
the relaxed constitutional rules that apply to such searches. This
analysis is, of course, as in the Bertine case, a straightforward application of a "case-by-case" pretext search doctrine using both objective
and subjective criteria to establish the pretext.
D.

New York v. Burger

A few weeks after ic decided Ortega, the Supreme Court in New
York v. Burger194 handed down a decision that once again directly
confronted the issue of the proper analysis of pretext searches. The
primary issue in Burger was whether the warrantless search of an automobile junkyard pursuant to a New York state statute authorizing
such searches fell within the exception to the fourth amendment
warrant requirement carved out for administrative inspections of
pervasively regulated industries. A six-justice majority of the Court,
in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, held that it did and that, accordingly, the search in question was constitutional.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 744 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 746.
107 S. Ct. 2636(1987).
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In discussing the evidence actually discovered in this junkyard
search, the Burger Court cited to the cryptic parenthetical language
in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez relating to pretexts, 1 9 5 previously discussed, for the proposition that "[t]he discovery of evid e n c e o f crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrate
inspection d o e s n o t render that search illegal o r the administrative
s c h e m e suspect." 1 9 * 1 T h e key question, o f course, for pretext purp o s e s , is w h e n is a search otherwise proper? T h e Burger Court answered this important question in a lengthy footnote appended to
the language q u o t e d above, noting the existence o f two different
types o f pretexts that might make a search not "otherwise proper."
T h e first type o f pretext mentioned is the possibility o f pretext
o n the part o f the New York Legislature that enacted the warrantless
junkyard inspection statute. T h e defendant in Burger argued that
the legislature actually enacted the statute for criminal investigatory—rather than administrative—purposes. T h e Burger Court
seemingly accepted defendant's argument that "pretextual" legislation might b e constitutionally deficient, but nonetheless ruled that
there was n o e v i d e n c e o f such pretext on the record in this case:
" T h e legislative history o f [this statute], in general, and [the inspection s u b - s e c t i o n ] , in particular, reveals that the N e w York Legislature had properly [sic] regulatory purposes for enacting the
administrative s c h e m e and was not using it as a 'pretext' to enable
law e n f o r c e m e n t authorities to gather evidence o f penal law
violations." 1 9 7
T h e s e c o n d type o f pretext noted by tjie Burger Court is the type
o f pretext discussed throughout this Article, namely searches made
by agents o f the state, usually law enforcement officers, for reasons
that d o not constitute a proper legal justification for such activity.
T h e Burger Court d e e m e d the case before it constitutional in pan
because there was n o pretext since the reasons for making the search
in this case did in fact constitute a proper legal justification for making such an administrative search. In Justice Blackmun's words,
speaking for the majority o f the Court, ' T h e r e is . . . n o reason to
believe that the instant inspection was actually a 'pretext' for obtaining e v i d e n c e o f [defendant's] violation o f penal laws. It is undisputed that the inspection was made solely pursuant to the
administrative s c h e m e . " 1 9 8 In short, the implication o f this lang u a g e is that if the "inspection" was not made for proper administra195. See discussion of VUlamonte-Marquez, supra text accompanying notes 15-31.
196.
107. S. Ct. at 2651 (emphasis added, footnote and citation to VillamonUMarquez omitted).
197. Id. at 2651 n.27 (citations omitted). The Court added that "an administrative scheme may have the same ultimate purpose as penal laws, even if its regulatory goals are narrower." Id. at 2659.
198. Id. at 2651 n.27.
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live reasons, but rather was made for investigatory reasons (without
probable cause or other lawful antecedent justification), the search
would have been unconstitutional.
That implicit suggestion, that such pretextual administrative
searches are unconstitutional, was made explicit in Justice Blackmun's next sentence, where he added that "[i]n fact, because the
search here was truly a[n administrative] inspection, the [New York]
Court of Appeals was able to reach in this case, as it could not in
People v. Pace, the question of the constitutionality of the statute."199
This reference by the Supreme Court in Burger to the Pace decision is important if cryptic standing alone and needs some explanation. The reason that the New York Court of Appeals in Pace did not
reach the question of the constitutionality of the junkyard administrative search statute—indeed, "could not" reach this question, in the
United States Supreme Court's view—was that the Pace case—unlike
Burger—involved a pretextual administrative search. The New York
Court of Appeals suppressed the evidence seized in Pace because, on
the facts on record, <4[t]he warrantless search of defendants* automobile salvage yard was not undertaken for administrative purposes."200 Indeed, it is notable that the record facts in Pace
established pretext strictly on the basis of the (subjective) testimonial evidence given by the searching officers' detailing their actual,
unlawful motivations for searching. As the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court concluded, 4t[T]he [searching] police officers expressly maintained that their mission was to gather evidence
of a crime rather than to administer any regulatory scheme. When a
search is not undertaken as a routine regulatory inspection the administrative
March rationale is simply inapplicable . . . ."2(H In short, the Pace decision
was o n e which held dispositive the fact that pretextual search and
seizure activity is ipso facto unconstitutional when subjective evidence
is utilized to establish the pretext. T h e United States Supreme
Court majority cited this decision with evident approval in Burger,
expressly contrasting it with the facts in Burger where there was n o
pretext a n d where, for that reason, the search was found to be
constitutional.
Furthermore, the three dissenting justices in Burger completely
agreed with the majority's analysis that such pretext searches are
unconstitutional. Indeed, the dissenters took the analysis o n e step
further; they also concluded, unlike the majority, that the Burger case
was in fact a case o f unconstitutional pretext and that the evidence
seized should, accordingly, be suppressed o n that basis. In Justice
Brennan's words, 4 4 [T]he State has used an administrative scheme as
199.
200.
201.
phasis

Id. (citation omitted).
People v. Pace, 65 N.Y.2d 684, 481 N.E.2d 250, 491 N.Y.S.2d 618, (1985).
People v. Pace, 101 A.D.2d 336, 340. 475 N.Y.S.2d 443, 446 (1984) (emadded, citations omitted).

408

UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT LA IV REVIEW [Vol. 66:363

a pretext to search without probable cause for evidence of criminal
violations. It thus circumvented the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment by altering the label placed on the search.*'202 Such
conduct, Justice Brennan made clear, citing numerous Supreme
Court decisions, violates established fourth amendment doctrine relating to the unconstitutionality of pretexts.203 What is more, Justice Brennan added, failure to recognize the significance of ignoring
such pretexts threatens the efficacy of any fourth amendment rules.
As his dissent concluded, "The implications of the Court's opinion,
if realized, will virtually eliminate Fourth Amendment protection of
commercial entities in the context of administrative searches. No
State may require, as a condition of doing business, a blanket submission to warrantless searches for any purpose/' 204 Exactly.

202. New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 2656 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
203. Justice Brennan explained:
In the law of administrative searches, one principle emerges with unusual
clarity and unanimous acceptance: the government may not use an adminstrative inspection scheme to search for criminal violations. See Michigan
v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292. 104 S. Ct. 641, 646, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984)
(opinion of Powell, J.) (in fire investigation, the constitutionality of a postfire inspection depends upon "whether the object of the search is to determine the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity");
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.499, 508, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1949, 56 L. Ed. 2d
486 (1978) (" 'if the authorities are seeking evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, the usual standard of probable cause will apply' ") (citations omitted); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S., at 598, n.6, 101 S. Ct., at
2538, n.6 ("[warrant and probable cause requirements] pertain when commercial properly is searched for contraband or evidence of crime"); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 278, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 2542,
37 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973) (Powell. J., concurring) (traditional probable
cause not required in border automobile searches because they are "undertaken primarily for administrative rather than prosecutorial purposes"); Carnara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S., at 539, 87 S. Ct.. at 1736
(authorization of administrative searches on less than probable cause will
not "endange(r| time-honored doctrines applicable to criminal investigations"); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S., at 549. 87 S. Ct., at 1742 (Clark, J.,
dissenting) ("nothing . . . suggests that the inspection was . . . designed as
a basis for a criminal prosecution"); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,
226, 80 S. Ct. 683, 690, 4 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1960) ("[t]he deliberate use by
the Government of an administrative warrant for the purpose of gathering
evidence in a criminal case must meet stern resistance by the courts"); id.
at 248, 80 S. Ct. at 701 (Douglas J., dissenting) (Government cannot evade
the Fourth Amendment "by the simple device of wearing the masks of
(administrative] officials while in fact they are preparing a case for criminal
prosecution"); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365, 79 S. Ct. 804, 808, 3
L. Ed. 2d 877 (1959) ("evidence of criminal action may not . . . be seized
without a judicially issued search warrant").
Id. at 2655 (footnote omitted).
204. Id. at 2657-58.
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CONCLUSION: MISSOURI r. BI^IH REDUX

The import of the four recent Supreme Court decisions discussed above is that they provide the answers to the fourth amendment pretext search doctrine questions that were before the Court
in Missouri v. Blair, but which were left unanswered when the Court
cryptically dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted.205
The first question before the Court in Blair was as follows:
(1) Was the Blair Court correct in applying a case-by-case
pretext analysis? Or, put another way, was the Blair Court
correct in assuming that suppression of evidence seized as
a result of pretextual fourth amendment activity was compelled or otherwise appropriate?
There is absolutely no question when the Supreme Court's derisions in Bertine, Garrison, Ortega, and Burger are considered that the
Blair Court's use of a case-by-case analysis of pretexts, compelling a
finding of unconstitutionality where relevant pretexts are established, was correct. Ail of the opinions in all four of those cases
cither used or implicitly accepted such an analysis. There was never
even a suggestion in any of those cases that Professor Haddad's
"hard-choice" approach reflected settled fourth amendment policy
or had subsumed the necessity for—or the appropriateness of—consideration of pretexts on a case-by-case basis.
The second question before the Supreme Court in Blair was as
follows:
(2) Was the Blair Court majority correct in ruling that
when the record evidence established that an arrest was
made in bad faith, i.e., as a pretextual means to arrest and
acquire evidence about a crime where there was no probable cause, the arrest was ipso facto unconstitutional? Or, in
contrast, were the Blair Court dissenters correct in arguing
that where the record established that a lawful parking
arrest could be made, it does not matter how or why such an
arrest was actually made?
Again, all of the opinions in Bertine, Garrison, Ortega, and Burger
directly or indirectly support the view of the Blair Court majority
that such "bad faith" fourth amendment activity is unconstitutional.
The Bertine Court made this point most cogently, finding inventory
searches of the contents of impounded vehicles unconstitutional
where the searching officers "acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation." 206 Furthermore, the Garrison majority opinion would appear to make it clear that the Missouri Supreme Court
205.
206.

See supra text accompanying note 139.
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987).
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dissenters* view in Blair that fourth amendment activity can be justified on the basis of what could have happened rather than what did
happen is quite simply incorrect.207
Finally, the third question put before the Court by the parties in
Blair (although unnecessary to a decision) was as follows:
(3) Is the subjective motivation of the searching or arresting officers—their bad faith (or lack thereof)—properly
considered in assessing whether or not there is a cognizable pretext?
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Once again, all of the opinions in Bertine, Garrison, Ortega, and I. Introduction
Burger directly or indirectly used or accepted the use of such subjecII. 1987 Amendments
tive criteria where it was necessary, i.e., where the objective evidence
A. MCR 9.101
was facially neutral, and where it was otherwise available and releB. MRC 9.104
vant. In particular, the Bertine majority expressly adopted a test for
t4
C. MCR 9.106
pretext including a subjective bad faith'* analysis, the Garrison maD. MCR 9.112
jority used subjective evidence of motivation to determine the conE. MCR 9.113
stitutionality of a search, the Ortega Court turned the ultimate
F. MCR 9.114
resolution of that case on evidence of the searchers* actual motives
G. MCR 9.115
for searching, and the Burger majority noted that subjective evidence
H. MCR 9.116
of pretext could be dispositive of the issue of constitutionality, while
I.
MCR 9.118
the Burger Court dissenters found evidence of pretext on the record
and, indeed, ruled that it was dispositive.
J.
MCR 9.119
K. MCR 9.120
In short, while a Supreme Court decision in Missouri v. Blair
L. MCR 9.121
would have been the surest and most direct way to obtain resolution
M. MCR 9.122
of the most troubling questions raised by a few judges and commenN. MCR 9.125
tators relating to the existence and content of the pretext search
O. MCR 9.126
doctrine, the four recent Supreme Court decisions discussed above
P. MCR 9.127
answered all of the questions raised in Blair—and then some. Lower
Q. MCR 9128
court opinions that state or imply that the Scott, Villamonte-Marquez,
or any other Supreme Court decision handed down prior to Bertine, III. Proposed Amendments Not Adopted
Garrison, Ortega, and Burger, have commanded the evisceration of a
A. MCR 9.106(B)
workable pretext search doctrine are, quite simply, in the light of
B. MCR 9.111
these recent rulings, dead wrong.208 These decisions make it clear
C. MCR 9.123
beyond peradventure that pretext searches are unconstitutional
D. MCR 9.124
and, further, that it is appropriate to utilize evidence of searching
E. MCR 9.132
officers* motivation in determining constitutionality. Whether or
not the pretext search doctrine ever left, it has returned.
* Copyright © 1989 by Michael Alan Schwartz

207. See supra text accompanying notes 175-79.
208. See, ?.#., United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987). The Causey
majority opinion, which was based in large part upon a mistaken reading of Scott
and rillamonte~.\/ai(/uez, flatly "validated so-called pretextual arrest warrants."
United States v. Zukas, 843 F.2d 179. 182 n.I (5th Cir. 1988).
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